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PREFACE 
The feasibility of institutional and/or individual 
investments in farmland was determined by using the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model to compare the expected return from 
farmland, based on historical trends, to the required rate 
of return for investors with a diversified portfolio. The 
risk-return characteristics of farmland appear to be 
favorable for investors with a diversified portfolio but the 
unique characteristics of farmland violate the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model's assumptions and prevent a definite 
conclusion. 
Multiperiod linear progamming models show that increased 
availability of rental land resulting from increased 
farmland ownership by non-farmers could significantly 
increase farmers' earnings and farm firm growth. 
I wish to thank the faculty, staff, and graduate students 
in the Department of Agricultural Economics for sharing 
their time, knowledge, and friendship. I am particularly 
thankful to my major advisor, Dr. James Plaxico for always 
asking the right questions, and my other committee members, 
Dr. Marcia Tilley and Dr. Ted Nelson, for their help and 
guidance. I especially appreciate the encouragement and 
support of my family. 
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Farming has become increasingly capital intensive due to 
pressures to adopt new technology and the various incentives 
to expand the size 0£ £arms. Capital can be obtained £rom 
retained earnings and operator investment (internal equity>, 
borrowing (debt>, 
or by leasing. 
£rom outside investors (external equity>, 
Internal equity £inancing allows operators to exercise 
complete management control 0£ assets but the availability 
0£ equity capital may severely limit capital accumulation, 
£irm growth, and earnings. 
Debt £inancing imposes some limitations on management 
control and increases £inancial risk to the operator's 
equity. The operator may be required to limit risk with 
insurance, hedging, £inancial constraints, or other means. 
With the creation 0£ the Farm Credit System, Farmers Home 
Administration, and access to £unds £rom private individ-
uals, commercial banks and insurance companies, debt 
£inancing has been readily available to credit-worthy 
£armers Cl>. Debt capital limitations depend upon the 
operator's £inancial condition, the characteristics 0£ the 
operation, and lender policy. 
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Limitations on management control may vary widely when 
external equity is used to provide capital. Sources 0£ 
external equity may range £ram in£ormal investments by 
relatives to selling stock in a corporation. The amount 0£ 
external equity which can be raised is limited by the 
operator's ability to £ind willing investors. 
Leasing is a means 0£ controlling assets owned and 
£inanced by outside equity and/or debt. Since the operator 
is obligated to make rent payments, long term leases may 
create £inancial leverage and risk considerations similar to 
borrowing. The operator's control 0£ leased assets is 
limited by the terms 0£ the lease contract. Leasing a 
signi£icant portion 0£ total assets may impose management 
limitations on the entire operation. The limitations to 
leasing are the terms and availability 0£ the lease asset 
and the ability 0£ the operator to make lease payments. 
Leasing an asset £rees the operator £ram the risk 0£ 
unexpected depreciation or obsolescence, but precludes 
wind£all gains £ram appreciation. 
Problem Setting 
Farmers have met their increasing capital needs primarily 
with their own equity, leasing, and debt. Very little 
outside equity is used. The availability 0£ outside equity 
is limited by the earning potential 0£ the operation and the 
high costs 0£ £ormal arrangements needed to attract equity 
£rom beyond the realm 0£ £riends and £amily. In addition, 
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outside investments in the operation may be incompatible 
with the operator's objectives. 
Leasing has provided an important source 0£ control £or 
land, and to a lesser extent, equipment and livestock. 
Leasing can be bene£icial £or both parties due to ownership 
advantages arising £ram di££erences in opportunity costs 0£ 
capital and taxes. 
Debt has been a widely used method 0£ increasing returns 
to the operator's equity but the £inancial leverage created 
by debt can also rapidly decrease the operator's equity 
under adverse conditions. Twenty percent 0£ Oklahoma 
£armers have debt-to-asset ratios <DIA) over 0.4 and over 30 
percent 0£ £armers in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska and North 
Dakota have DIA ratios over 0.4 <2>. Farmers with D/A ratios 
over 0.4 are commonly considered to be subject to at least 
moderate £inancial stress. However, the level 0£ debt a 
£armer can service varies depending on the amount 0£ o££-
£arm income and the operation's characteristics. 
The high proportion 0£ £armers with DIA ratios over 0.4 
coupled with declining asset values and low commodity prices 
indicates that many £armers may need to adjust their capital 
structure to reduce debt. With limited, and in many cases 
decreasing, operator equity and limited sources 0£ outside 
equity, the only alternative available to some £armers is to 
sell assets and lease assets back in order to maintain or 
increase the size 0£ the operation. 
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Farmland constitutes about 75 percent 0£ £armers' assets 
and may be a suitable asset to sell and replace by leasing. 
Purchases 0£ £armland by individuals and/or institutional 
investors such as insurance companies, agribusinesses, 
investment £irms, or other large outside investors would 
provide equity to the £arm sector and reduce £armers' equity 
capital needs. 
The ownership and operation 0£ £arms by corporations has 
been an emotional issue and by January 1983, 15 states 
restricted ownership and operation by corporations (3). The 
scope 0£ land ownership restrictions vary among states as 
does the list 0£ exceptions. Common exceptions exclude 
entities such as £amily £arm corporations, corporations 
engaged in research, or other specially authorized corpor-
ations, such as cattle £eeding operations, 
restrictions. 
£ram the general 
In Oklahoma, corporations may acquire real estate by 
mortgage £oreclosure or in collection 0£ a debt but it must 
be disposed 0£ within seven years 0£ acquisition (4). 
Corporations are only allowed to own land which is necessary 
£or their normal business operations ( 4) • The type 0£ 
restrictions imposed and the exceptions allowed by Oklahoma 
are £airly common. Oklahoma law pertaining to the ownership 
0£ £armland is included in appendix A. 
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Objectives and Methodology 
The possibility 0£ individual and/or institutional 
investments in £armland providing substantial sources 0£ 
equity capital to the £arm sector is dependent on the risk-
return characteristics 0£ £armland relative to alternative 
investments. I£ individual or institutional ownership is 
£easible, an increase in non-£armer owned land could result 
in increased availability 0£ rental land. Increased 
availability 0£ rental land may result in signi£icantly 
increased £arm earnings. The objectives 0£ this study are: 
l> Determine i£ £armland is a £easible investment, in 
a diversi£ied port£olio, £or individual and/or 
institutional investors. 
2> Evaluate the e££ect increased availability 0£ 
rental land may have on a £armer's earnings. 
The risk characteristics 0£ an investment as well as the 
rate 0£ return are important considerations to investors. 
Investors require a higher rate 0£ return £or investments as 
risk increases. The Capital Asset Pricing Model <CAPM> 
provides a £ramework to compare the risk-return character-
istics 0£ £armland to the risk-return characteristics 0£ 
other assets to determine i£ £armland is a £avorable invest-
ment. Some £undamental principles, underlying assumptions, 
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and empirical tests of the CAPM are reviewed and the model 
is applied to analyze investments in farmland. 
Multiperiod linear programing models are used to deter-
mine how much rented and owned land is required to maximize 
the present value of a farmer's earnings. The optimal 
solutions are compared to solutions in which the avail-
ability of rental land is restricted. The differences in 
objective function values show the benefit of greater access 
to rental land. The unrestricted solutions also provide an 
expansion path of the farmer's land base and indicate the 
optimal composition of rented and owned land. 
CHAPTER II 
CRITERIA FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
Investors desire a high expected rate 0£ return but the 
risk associated with an investment is also important. The 
risk 0£ an asset is re£lected in the variation 0£ its 
expected returns. The riskier the investment the more the 
expected returns vary, there£ore one measure 0£ risk is the 
variance or standard deviation 0£ expected returns. An 
investor £aced with two investments having the same 
expected return would choose the investment with the lowest 
variance. Similarly, i£ the investor were to choose 
between two investments having the same variance, the 
investment with the highest expected return would be 
chosen. 
£igure 1. 
This mean-variance criteria is illustrated in 
Asset A is pre£erred to asset B since the same expected 
returns can be obtained with more certainty. Asset D is 
pre£erred to asset C since both assets have similar 
variance but asset D has higher expected returns. The 
decision between A and D depends on the investor's atti-
tudes towards risk. The investor may choose to invest in a 
combination 0£ assets. 
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Figure 1. Mean-Variance Criteria 
The expected income £or a given level 0£ variability can 
be increased by investing in a combination 0£ assets as long 
as their returns are not perfectly correlated. To show this 
principle, developed by Markowitz (5), the £allowing example 
will be used : 
Expected Rate 
0£ Return E<R> 
Stocks .15 






0£ Returns <r1. 
.3 
Assuming equal investments in both assets, the expected 
return £rom the combination 0£ investments is a weighted 
average 0£ returns: 
where, 
E<RP) = Expected rate 0£ return to the portfolio 
Ai = Percent of portfolio consisting of land 
E<Ri > = Expected rate of return to land 
E<R. > = Expected rate of return to stocks 
If 50 percent of the portfolio is land, then: 
E<RP> = <.5*.21>+<.5*.15> = .18 
The income variance of the portfolio is: 
ap 2 = <Ai*O'i >2 +[(1-Ai >*a.J 2 +2CAi*<1-Ai >*ri.*0'1*a.J 
where, 
O'p 2 = variance 0£ the port£olio 
Ai = percent 0£ port£olio consisting 0£ land 
ai = standard deviation of land returns 
a. = standard deviation of stock returns 
!1. =correlation coefficient 
so that, 
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The portfolio's variance is a weighted average of the 
individual variances only if the correlation coefficient 
equals one; otherwise, averaging the two income streams 
reduces relative variability. If the correlation 
10 
coefficient equals negative one, a combination of assets 
could be purchased so that the variance equaled zero. 
Risk can be classified as systematic and non-systematic. 
Systematic risk is market related and cannot be eliminated 
by diversification. Non-systematic risk is unique to the 
investment and can be eliminated by diversification. The 
relevant risk-return trade-off faced by the investor is 




L ____ .... _____________ .. __ , 
10 20 30 40 
Figure 2. Efficiency Frontier 
An efficiency frontier showing the risk-return trade-off 
of all investments available to the investor is known as the 
market efficiency frontier. 
The expected return of a portfolio is the weighted 
average of the expected returns of each investment in the 
portfolio. The variance of returns for a portfolio with 
several investments is: 
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aa p = I:1-1I:J•1 A1AJcr1J 
where, 
aa P = variance of the portfolio 
A1 = proportion of stock i in the portfolio 
AJ = proportion of stock j in the portfolio 
0" 1 J = covariance between stocks i and j 
In the mid-1960's Sharpe (6) and Lintner (7) showed that 
by including a risk-free investment such as Treasury bills, 
all investors would select a particular combination of risky 
assets for their portfolios regardless of personal risk-
return preferences. 
The investor would pick portfolio M <the market port-
folio) to maximize utility regardless of the point where the 
investor's indifference curve is tangent to the efficiency 
frontier. Based on the separation theorem, the investor 
would hold portfolio M and either lend or borrow in the 
capital market. Investor A whose indifference curve is I. 
would reach a higher indifference curve by investing in a 
combination of risk-free assets and portfolio M than by 
investing in portfolio G. Investor B whose indifference 
curve is depicted by Ib would reach a higher indifference 
curve by investing in portfolio M and borrowing money to 
purchase additional units of M, than investing in portfolio 






Figure 3. Port£olio Selection with Risk-
Free Investment 
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The line passing through the risk-free investment and 
tangent to the e£ficiency £rontier is the Capital Market 
Line. All e£ficient port£olios will be on the Capital 
Market Line CCML>. The equation 0£ the CML is: 
E (RP ) = Rr + [ ( E ( R. ) -Rr ) I a. J a (RP ) 
where, 
ECRp > = expected return for port£olios along the 
CML 
Rr - risk-free borrowing and lending rate 
ECR. > = expected return on the market portfolio 
a. = standard deviation of returns on market 
portfolio 
a(RP) = standard deviation of returns for 
portfolios along the CML 
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Since an investor would not accept a return less than the 
expected return and any returns above the expected return 
would be wind£all gains, the required rate 0£ return £or an 
investment is its expected rate 0£ return. The market price 
0£ risk £or a port£olio is expressed by the term [E<R. >-
R,J/cr •. 
Application of the CAPM 
The previously described framework for determining the 
optimum portfolio is known as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model < CAPM > • The CAPM also provides a basis for valuing 
individual risky assets. 
Since diversifiable <non-systematic) risk can be elimi-
nated, the investor is only concerned with nondiversifiable 
risk. The amount of nondiversi£iable (systematic) risk the 
asset has relative to the market is known as beta. The 
market portfolio has a beta of one. Beta is calculated as : 
B1 = Gov< R1 , R. >I cr 2 • 
where, 
B1 = beta value of asset i 
Cov(R 1 ,R.) =the covariance of returns to asset i 
and the market 
cr 2 • = the variance of the market port£olio 
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Beta can be calculated by using the least squares 
regression equation 
- R, = a + B * CE< R. > - R, ] + e 
where, 
= expected returns to land 
R, = returns to the risk-£ree asset 
E<R.) = expected returns to the market port£olio 
a = intercept 
B = beta 
e = error term 
The intercept term has an expected value 0£ zero. A 
positive alpha value would indicate that the returns are in 
excess 0£ that required £or the degree 0£ risk the asset 
has. Negative alpha values indicate that the returns are 
inadequate to compensate £or the risk 0£ the asset. 
The Capital Market Line can be used to determine the 
required rate 0£ return £or e££icient port£olios but it 
cannot be used to evaluate an individual risky asset since 
the non-diversi£iable risk 0£ the asset determines its 
required rate 0£ return, not the standard deviation 0£ the 
asset. In order to determine the required rate 0£ return 
£or an individual risky asset the CML must be expressed in 
terms 0£ beta. 
CML: E<Rp > = R, + [ <E<R. >-R, >la. ]aCRp > 
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The CML expressed in terms 0£ individual assets rather 
than portfolios is: 
Since all points along the CML are perfectly correlated 
with the market portfolio crJ. = 1), the standard deviation 
0£ returns to asset j 
changing results: 
can be multiplied by rJ• without 
Further manipulation 0£ the equation yields the desired 
f'ormula giving the expected return of' the risky asset in 
equilibrium as a £unction of' beta: 
E<RJ > = R, + [E<R. >-R, J * Cov<RJ, R. )/a 2 • 
This equation is the Security Market Line <SML>. The SML 
can be used to determine the expected rate 0£ return £or 
individual risky assets. The relationship 0£ the Capital 
Market Line and the Security Market Line is shown in 















The Capital Market Line and 
Security Market Line 
B 
Assets A and B in £igure 4a both have the same expected 
return but the total variance 0£ the individual assets are 
di££erent. Although total variance 0£ each asset is 
di££erent, their nondiversi£iable variance is the same and 
both assets would £all on the Securities Market Line (4b> at 
point X. Asset C has the same expected return but has higher 
nondiversi£iable risk than A and B. Asset C would be below 
the Security Market Line at a point represented by Y in 
£igure 4b. Since asset C earns a lower than required rate 
0£ return, the price will drop, increasing the rate of 
return. In equilibrium, all assets will be along the 
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Security Market Line. The required rate 0£ return £or an 
asset can be £ound using the Securities Market Line £ormula: 
ra = Rj' + Ba * ( R. -Rj' > 
where, 
r1 = required rate 0£ return on asset i 
R, = risk-£ree rate 0£ return 
Ba = beta 0£ asset i 
R. = expected rate 0£ return on the market 
port£olio 
Limitations 0£ the CAPM 
The validity 0£ the CAPM relies on the £allowing six 
assumptions described by Weston and Copeland (8): 
1. Investors are risk-averse individuals who maximize 
the expected utility 0£ their end-0£-period 
wealth. 
2. Investors are price takers and have homogeneous 
expectations about asset returns which have a 
joint normal distribution. 
3. There exists a risk-£ree asset such that investors 
may borrow or lend unlimited amounts at the 
risk-£ree rate. 
4. The quantities 0£ all risky assets are £ixed. 
Also, all assets are marketable and per£ectly 
divisible. 
5. Asset markets are £rictionless and in£ormation is 
costless and simultaneously available to all 
investors. 
6. There are no market imper£ections such as taxes, 
transaction costs, regulations, or restrictions on 
short-selling. 
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Weston and Copeland note that most 0£ these assumptions 
can be relaxed without changing the important properties 0£ 
the CAPM. Brealey and Myers (9) contend that the assump-
tions underlying the CAPM are not crucial .and that it is 
possible to modi£y the model to handle them. 
Empirical tests show that there may be problems with the 
CAPM £ormulation. Factors such as price-earnings ratio, 
size 0£ £irm, and high dividend yields explain a portion 0£ 
returns not explained by beta <8>. An empirically estimated 
market line has an intercept higher than the risk-£ree rate 
0£ return and the slope is less than the slope 0£ the 
theoretically derived Security Market Line (8). The 
empirical results indicate that low-beta assets earn more 
than the CAPM predicts and high-beta assets earn less than 
the CAPM predicts. 
The CAPM is difficult to test empirically since it is 
based on expected returns but can only be tested by actual 
returns. Another problem encountered in testing the CAPM is 
that the market portfolio consists 0£ all risky assets, such 
a port£olio is difficult to construct or simulate for 
testing purposes (8). 
Tests by Fama and MacBeth ClO> show that actual returns 
do plot roughly along the Security Market Line with some 
time periods yielding much more impressive results than 
others. 
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Despite the imper£ections 0£ the CAPM it can be a 
bene£icial tool £or practical application as long as results 
are analyzed with the possible biases 0£ the model in mind. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CAPM APPLIED TO FARMLAND 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been applied to 
farmland and agricultural assets in previous studies. 
Barry <11> used the CAPM to evaluate investments in 
farmland for ten production regions and the United States 
using data from 1950 through 1977. Barry used 9 to 12 
month U.S. government securities as the risk-free asset and 
an index consisting of stocks, bonds, and farm real estate 
as a proxy of the market portfolio. Returns to farmland 
were estimated by adding the change in the farm real estate 
price index to returns to land from farm production. 
Returns to land from farm production were derived by 
estimating net income from farm production and subtracting 
returns to labor, management, and non-real estate assets. 
Barry's results indicated that farm real estate has 
lower variation relative to mean returns than the market 
index. Low beta values and high alpha values imply that 
investments in farm real estate earned more relative to 
risk than the market index and most individual assets 
during the period from 1950 to 1977. Barry noted that the 
confidence intervals £or sample betas were relatively wide 
but beta values appeared to be between 0 and .5 which is 
20 
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similar to betas on long-term bonds and lower than most 
common stocks which tend to be between .5 and 1.5 • 
Rather than using the CAPM as a benchmark for compari-
son, Moss, Featherstone, and Baker <12> investigated the 
desirability of farm assets in the market portfolio based 
on expected earnings-variance criteria. An efficiency 
frontier was developed with investment opportunities 
available in common stocks, small capitalization stocks, 
long-term corporate bonds, long-term U.S. Government bonds, 
U.S. Treasury bills, and farm assets. The study is based 
on data from 1926 through 1984. Returns to farm assets 
were obtained from Melichar's Agricultural Finance Databook 
<13). Farm assets were determined to be part of a well-
diversified portfolio. 
A portfolio model developed by Feldstein <14> shows an 
important relationship between reproducible capital 
(business capital> and land. Due to the effects of taxes, 
inflation causes the real price of land to increase and the 
real price of reproducible capital goods to decrease. This 
relationship indicates that inflation would tend to cause 
the beta for farmland to be low and unstable as inflation 
rates change. 
Investments in farmland will be evaluated using the CAPM 
to establish the appropriate discount rate for farmland 
based on farmland's beta. If the expected rate of return 
is equal to or greater than the required rate of return, 
22 
£armland can be considered a good investment £or investors 
holding a diversi£ied port£olio. 
Farmland earnings used in the study are the earnings 
from Oklahoma £armland from 1945 through 1985 as reported 
in Farm Real Estate Market Developments <15>. Earnings are 
calculated as the price increase plus rental payments less 
property taxes. Prices, taxes, and earnings for Oklahoma 
farmland are shown in table I. 
The risk-free asset is a 10 year Treasury bond. 
Standard and Poor's composite of 500 common stocks is used 
as a proxy for the market portfolio <16>. Returns to the 
risk-free asset and the market portfolio are shown in table 
II. Returns to the risk-free asset, 
and land are plotted in figure 5. 
the market portfolio, 
The beta value for 
Oklahoma farmland is found by the least squares regression 
model: 
Ri -R, = a + 81 * < R. - R, > + e 
The results are as follows: 
EC Ri -R, > = 5. 30 - . 123 * < R. - R, > 
The beta value of -.123 indicates that land returns 
increase (decrease) when the market return decreases 
< increases> • Assets with negative betas allow investors to 
substantially diversify their portfolios. The alpha value 
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TABLE I 
RETURNS FRltl OKLAHltlA FARMLAND 
------------------------------------------------------------
GROSS LAND PROPERTY NET PERCENT 'l. CURRENT 
YEAR RENT VALUE TAXES RETURN RETURN RETURN 
------------------------------------------------------------
1945 2.86 48.88 8.62 7.61 19.83 6.53 
1946 2.91 45.BB 8.58 8.65 19.22 5.89 
1947 3.42 51.88 8.68 8.87 15.83 6.83 
1948 3.69 56.88 8.64 7.33 13.89 5.95 
1949 3.88 68.88 8.68 1.39 2.32 5.65 
1958 3.71 58.88 8.69 18 .31 17.78 5.71 
1951 4.86 65.BB 8.58 14.68 22.59 5.67 
1952 4.82 76.88 8.55 2.68 3.42 4.74 
1953 4.38 75.88 8.59 -8.86 -8.88 5.25 
1954 4.27 71.88 8 .61 9.84 13.85 5.48 
1955 4.34 77.88 8.59 6.89 8.94 5.85 
1956 4.51 88.88 8.59 9.84 11.38 5.85 
1957 4.88 85.88 8.61 5.28 6.21 5.94 
1958 4.72 86.BB 8.68 14.28 16.52 - 4.89 
1959 5.47 96.88 8.58 9.91 18.33 5.12 
1968 5.32 181.88 8.58 6.73 6.67 4.69 
1961 5.56 183.88 8.68 13.86 13.46 4.72 
1962 5.78 112.88 8.64 18.98 16.95 4.45 
1963 6.13 126.88 8.59 16.39 13.81 4.28 
1964 6.23 137.88 8.56 28.46 14.94 3.99 
1965 7.14 152.BB 8.56 18.29 12.83 4.14 
1966 7.75 164.88 9.58 8.89 5.37 4.15 
1967 7.36 166.88 8.57 29.41 17.72 3.86 
1968 8.95 189 .88 8.58 8.95 4.74 3.68 
1969 8.48 191.88 8.56 28.33 14.83 3.84 
1978 9.29 212.98 9.54 23.15 18.92 3.84 
1971 9.82 227.98 8.53 -2.38 -1.85 3.88 
1972 9.86 216.88 8.63 31.58 14.58 3.93 
1973 18.75 239.88 0.56 . 69.41 29.04 3.94 
1974 12.96 299.88 8.48 59.52 19.91 3.85 
1975 14.36 347.88 8.42 64.98 18.78 3.72 
1976 15.99 399.88 8.37 46.51 11.66 3.64 
1977 17 .89 431.88 0.34 31.62 7.34 3.63 
1978 16.58 447.88 8 .31 78.11 17.48 3.38 
1979 19.58 518.88 8.29 185.82 28.59 3.53 
1988 18.98 597.88 8.26 40.35 6.76 2.91 
1981 28.48 628.88 8.24 94.91 15.31 3.85 
1982 21.18 696.88 8.24 -15.49 -2.23 2.88 
1983 19.83 661.88 8.26 18.11 2.74 2.74 
1984 17.847 661.88 8.26 -118 .87 -16.77 2.44 
1985 19.758 534.88 8.29 -61.79 -11.57 3.41 
1986 454.88 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S.D.A. 'Farm Real Estate Market Developments• 
Washington, D.C., ECRS, ~arious issues. 
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TABLE II 
RE"TURNS FROM THE MARKET PORTFOLI 0 
AND Rl SK-FREE ASSET 
---------------------------------------------------
--------- S&P 500 -------- CONSIJ1ER TEN YEAR 
STOCK PRICE TREASURY 
YEAR INDEX DIVIDEND EARNINGS INDEX BONDS 
---------------------------------------------------
1945 15.16 4 .17 12.66 53.9 2.370 
1946 17.08 3.85 -11.18 58.5 2 .190 
1947 15 .17 4.93 2.37 66.9 2.250 
1948 15.53 5.54 -1.93 i2. l 2.440 
1949 15.23 6.59 20.81 71.4 2.310 
1950 18.40 6.57 21.41 72.1 2.320 
1951 22.34 6 .13 9.67 77.8 2.570 
1952 24.50 5.80 0.94 79.5 2.680 
1953 24.73 5.80 20 .06 B0.1 2.850 
1954 29.69 4.95 36.38 80.5 2.400 
1955 40.49 UB 15 .14 30 .2 2.820 
1956 46.62 4.09 -4.80 81.4 3 .180 
1957 44.38 4.35 4 .19 B4.3 3.650 
195B 46.24 3.77 24.09 86.6 3.329 
1959 57.3B 3.23 -2.67 87.3 4.330 
1960 55.85 3.47 l B .6.~ 88.7 4 .120 
1961 66.27 2.98 -5.87 99.6 3.880 
1962 62.38 3.37 12.31 90.6 3.950 
1963 69.87 3 .17 16.46 91.7 4.000 
1964 Bl.37 3.01 3.36 92.9 4.190 
1965 BB .17 3.00 -3.30 94.5 4.280 
1966 85.26 3.40 7.82 97.2 4.m 
1967 91.93 3.20 7 .3-6 100.0 5.070 
196B 98.70 3.07 -0.87 104.2 5.650 
1969 97.94 3.24 -14.94 109 .8 6.670 
1970 83.22 'l !!'l ............ 18 .11 116 .3 7.3:~ 
1971 9B.29 3 .14 11 '10 121.3 6.160 
1972 199 .20 2.84 -1 .n 125.3 6.210 
1973 187.43 3.06 -22.88 133.1 6.840 
1974 B2.95 4,47 4.00 147.7 7.560 
1975 86.16 4.31 lB.40 161.2 7.990 
1976 102.01 3.77 -3.73 17e.s 7.610 
1977 98.20 4.62 -2.22 181.5 7.420 
1978 96.82 5.28 7.28 195.4 8 .'l10 
1979 103.01 5.47 15.31 217.4 9.440 
1988 l!B. 78 5.26 7.29 246.8 11.460 
1991 128.05 5.20 -6.51 272.4 13.910 
1982 119. 71 5.81 34.00 259 .1 13.000 
1983 168.41 4.43 0.03 298.4 11.100 
1984 160.46 4.64 16.44 310.7 12.440 
1985 186.84 4.25 27.37 322.2 10.62 
1986 237.97 
---------------------------------------------------
Source: Federal Re;er~e Soard. ~F'?de~·a.1 Ri?:.er~;i~ 
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oi 5.30 indicates that iarmland has earned premium returns 
as compared to the market portiolio. 
The standard error oi the beta estimate is .1268, the 
standard error oi the alpha estimate is 1.804, and the 
standard error oi the excess returns <Ri-RF > is 10.56 • 
The 95 percent coniidence intervals £or beta, alpha, and 
E<Ri-Rr> are: 
-.379 < B < .133 
2.181 < a < 9.474 
-10.51 < E<Ri-Rr > ~ 32.15 
Accepting the estimated beta oi -.123 , and using the 
1945 to 1985 average return to 10 year treasury bonds as a 
proxy £or the risk-iree asset and 1945 to 1985 returns to 
the S&P 500 index as a proxy £or the market portiolio's 
returns, the required rate oz return can be iound using the 
Securities Market Line iormula: 
ri = 5.75 - .123 * (7.70 - 5.75) 
r1 = 5. 75 - • 123 * 1. 95 
ri = 5.510 
Since the expected rate oi return to £armland is 10.82 
percent and the required rate 0£ return is only 5.51 
percent, £armland appears to be a very attractive 
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investment. Un£ortunately the analysis has not accounted 
£or two important £actors. The data period may over-
estimate the returns to land. The time period £ram 1945 
through 1985 includes the r~pid price increases which 
occurred in 1973 to 1982 but the opposing price decreases 
0£ the cycle may not be £ully represented since £armland 
prices are currently decreasing. 
The beta value estimated £ram the 1945 through 1985 data 
may also be a££ected. !£ Feldstein's hypothesis that 
in£lation causes the real price 0£ land to increase and the 
real price 0£ reproducible capital to decrease is correct, 
then a beta estimate £ram 1945 through 1972 data would be 
larger than the estimate £ram the 1945 through 1985 data. 
Although the beta estimate £ram 1945 through 1972 data may 
seem more appropriate since it re£lects the returns 
relationship under more normal circumstances, the beta 
estimate £ram 1945 through 1985 is important since it 
re£lects the relationship 0£ returns during high in£lation. 
One 0£ the objectives 0£ diversification is to gain 
protection £ram unfavorable extremes. The returns to land, 
the market, 
periods are: 

















Results 0£ the estimation model £or the period 1945 
through 1972 are: 
EC R1 -R, > = 7. 73 + • 0015 * CR. - R, > 
The standard error 0£ 845-72 is .105 and the 90 percent 
con£idence interval is £rom -.1806 to .1776. The estima-
tion model £or the period 1973 to 1985 is: 
E < R1 -R, > = -2. 029 - • 538 * < R. - R, > 
The standard error 0£ 87a-•5 is .2666 and the 90 percent 
con£idence interval is £rom -1.0168 to -.059 • We can 
conclude with 95 percent certainty that the two betas are 
signi£icantly di££erent. 
Beta is unstable but clearly low relative to mean 
returns. The upper bound £or any beta estimated is .1776 
< 1945 to 1972>. Assuming R, equals 5.75 and R. equals 7.70 
, the required rate 0£ return £or an asset with a beta 0£ 
.1776 is: 
r1 = 5.75 + .1776 * 1.95 
r1 = 6.10 
Given that the highest required rate 0£ return for any 
expected value of beta is 6.10 percent and the lowest mean 
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return £ram any period is 9.15 percent, £armland still 
seems to be a £avorable addition to the port£olio. 
The assumption that all assets are marketable and 
per£ectly divisible is violated by £armland when owned in 
the conventional way. The farmland market lacks liquidity; 
the normal volume 0£ sales is 4 to 5 percent 0£ all £arms 
per year. 
less and 
The assumption that asset markets are £riction-
information is costless and simultaneously 
available to all investors is also violated. The search 
and transaction costs 0£ £armland transfers are higher than 
those £or the assets included in the market port£olio. 
Earnings on £armland, like those on the market port-
£olio, are composed 0£ current returns and capital gains. 
Since the CAPM assumes a perfect market, capital gains can 
be easily realized and thus are additive to current 
returns. This assumption is not inhibiting to the market 
port£olio since the stocks it is composed 0£ are publicly 
traded in a well-£unctioning market. Capital gains £ram 
£armland must be realized by selling the asset in a market 
that is not liquid and that has high search and transaction 
costs. Search and transaction costs and the uncertainty 0£ 
the net realized price upon completion 0£ the sale 0£ land 
would cause the investor to discount the expected capital 
gains by some £actor, 
earnings are: 
n so that the expected value 0£ 
E <Vi > = E <CR i > + [ n * E <CG i > ] 
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where, 
ECV 1 > = expected value 0£ land earnings 
ECCR 1 = expected current returns to land 
E<CG1 > = expected capital gains on land 
n = unknown value £rem zero to one 
Current returns and capital gains can be analyzed 
separately by determining the beta £or current returns. 
The expected current return to land is 4.35 and the beta 
£or current returns is .0783 • Figure 6 shows both current 
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Figure 6. Current and Total Farmland Returns 
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Any value 0£ n would result in an ECV 1 > along the line 
TC. The value 0£ n at which E<V1 > is equal to the required 
rate 0£ return can be £ound by: determining the equation 0£ 
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the E<V1 > line as a £unction 0£ beta, solving £or the value 
0£ beta at which the E<V1 > line and the Security Market 
Line intersect, £inding the required rate 0£ return £or the 
speci£ied beta, and then solving the equation 0£ the land 
return line £or n so that E(V 1 ) equals the required rate 0£ 
return. 
The equation 0£ the land returns line can be £ound by 
determining the slope then using the point-slope £ormula to 
solve £or the equation. The equation is: 
E<V1 > = 6.867 - 32.141 * B 
The value 0£ B at which the lines intersect is .03 . 
The required rate 0£ return £or an asset with a beta value 
0£ .03 is 5.8085. The relationship 0£ returns £or land is: 
so that, 
E<V1 > = 4.35 + <n • 6.47> 
5.8085 = E<V1 > = 4.35 + <n • 6.47> 
n = .2254 
Any value 0£ n greater than 22.5 percent would result in 
an expected value 0£ returns greater than the required 
return. Although the speci£ic value 0£ n cannot be £ound, 
a review 0£ the £actors determining n may lead to an idea 
0£ its magnitude. n is the percentage 0£ the capital gains 
earned by land that are comparable in value to the 
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current returns to land and stocks or to the capital gains 
0£ stocks in the market port£olio. 
n accounts £or the abnormally high search and trans-
action cost 0£ selling land as compared to stocks and the 
risk 0£ the price declining be£ore the land can be sold. 
Total variation 0£ the land price is a major £actor in 
determining n. The size 0£ n also depends on the planned 
ownership period. The shorter the planned holding period, 
the smaller n will be. I£ the normal volume 0£ land market 
transactions is 4 to 5 percent 0£ all £arms per year then 
the average holding period is £rom 20 to 25 years. The 
discount £or trans£erring the asset every 20 to 25 years 
may be small but the liquidity 
coupled with the volatility 
small. 
0£ a declining land market 
0£ land prices may make n 
The presence 0£ taxes violates the assumption that there 
are no taxes, regulations, or restrictions on short 
selling. Since capital gains have been taxed di££erently 
than current returns, an asset with the same total returns 
but with a di££ering portion 0£ those returns consisting 0£ 
capital gains would have had a di££erent be£ore-tax 
discount rate which would a££ect the investment pre£erence. 
Earnings on the market port£olio consist 0£ 55.84 percent 
current returns and the earnings on £armland consist 0£ 
40.20 percent current returns. The di££erent ratios 0£ 
current returns to capital gains is not a signi£icant 
£actor. 
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The assumption that investors can borrow and lend at the 
risk-£ree rate is violated since the borrowing rate is 
greater than the lending rate. I£ the borrowing rate is 
greater than the lending rate the Security Market Line will 
have less slope when beta is greater than one. Since the 
relevant beta range is well below one this violation has no 
e££ect on the £armland analysis. The assumptions that 
investors are risk-averse, price takers and have homo-
geneous expectations about asset returns which have a joint 
normal distribution are not violated by any unique char-
acteristics 0£ this analysis. 
Farmland appears to be a good addition to a well-
diversi£ied port£olio based on historical trends. The beta 
value £or £arm-land may be unstable but it is low relative 
to expected earnings. Uncertainty about the value 0£ n 
prevents a de£inite conclusion. 
CHAPTER IV 
CRITERIA FOR ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF 
INCREASED INDIVIDUAL OR INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP OF FARMLAND 
The e££ects 0£ increased individual and/or institutional 
ownership 0£ £armland depend on the tenancy arrangements 0£ 
£arms prior to being purchased by the non-£armer investor. 
I£ £armland is purchased £ram an individual who rents the 
land to £armers, the availability 0£ rental land is 
unchanged. However, i£ £armland is purchased £ram current 
operators, the availability 0£ rental land will increase. 
The liquidity 0£ the £armland market could be increased i£ 
the holding period 0£ £armland investors became shorter, or 
i£ a more e££icient market structure were to emerge. It is 
assumed that some £armland would be purchased £ram current 
operators and the supply 0£ rental land would increase. 
The liquidity 0£ the £armland market is assumed to be 
unchanged. 
The increased supply 0£ rental land must be analyzed 
with respect to how it will a££ect £armers' objectives. 
Farmers may have various objectives which include: 
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1. Maximize Earnings <Before or After-Tax> 
2. Maximize Wealth 
3. Maximize Gross Income 
4. Maximize Farm Size 
5. Maximize the Amount of Owned Land 
6. Maximize Family Consumption 
7. Maximize Leisure Time 
8. Minimize Borrowing 
9. Minimize Risk 
10. Provide Community Services 
11. Maintain a Neat, Well-kept Farmstead 
Identifying one specific objective is often difficult. 
Several factors may be important and objectives may change 
with financial conditions or age of the operator. Some 
objectives may not be compatible with long term business 
survival in a competitive environment without limiting 
constraints. The objective function to be used for this 
analysis is to maximize the present value of before-tax 
earnings subject to a minimum family consumption, a maximum 
debt-to-asset ratio, and a maximum amount of family labor 
provided. Maximizing earnings also enables the firm to 
achieve maximum growth. 
The amount of owned and rented land required to maximize 
earnings must be determined to study the effects of rent 
limitations. The analysis requires three steps which 
include making assumptions to develop an example farm, 
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constructing a single-period linear program to determine 
the optimum farm organization, and developing multiperiod 
models to analyze the effects of rent limitations under 
various assumptions concerning land prices. 
Case Farm 
The case farm is located in Blaine County Oklahoma and 
consists of soils in the Shellabarger-Nobscot-Pratt soil 
association. The Shellabarger-Nobscot-Pratt soil associ-
ation covers 21 percent of Blaine County and is approxi-
mately 55 percent cropland and 45 percent pasture <17). 
Sixty percent of the cropland can be used to grow alfalfa, 
wheat, grain sorghum, and sudan. The remaining forty 
percent is limited to wheat, grain sorghum, and sudan. All 
land bought or rented has the same ratio of soils and 
cropping options. 
The operating activities available on the farm are: 
Stocker Steers 
Cow-Calf Operation 
Pasture <Land group 1> 
Alfalfa <Land group 2> 
Wheat for Grain <Land group 2 and 3) 
Grain Sorghum <Land group 2 and 3> 
Small Grain Graze-Out (Land group 2 and 3> 
Sudan Pasture (Land group 3) 
Cover Crop <Land group 3> 
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Enterprise budgets £or each activity are included in 
Appendix B. There are acreage restrictions £or al£al£a, 
grain sorghum and wheat £or grain. For each acre 0£ wheat 
£or grain there must be .38 acres 0£ small grain graze-out 
or cover crop to meet set-aside requirements £or government 
programs. This corresponds to a 27.5 percent set-aside 0£ 
base acreage. 
grain sorghum. 
A similar set-aside requirement applies to 
For each acre 0£ grain sorghum, there must 
be .25 acres 0£ sudan £or pasture or cover crop to £ul£ill 
the requirements 0£ a 20 percent set-aside 0£ the base 
acreage. Only 71 percent 0£ land group two may be planted 
to al£al£a. This is based on the assumption that an 
al£al£a stand will last £ive years then be £armed at least 
two years in other crops be£ore being replanted to al£al£a. 
The prices received £or wheat and grain sorghum include 
government payments in accordance with the required set-
aside £or 1987; they are not market prices. 
prices used in the analysis are: 
Bee£ Cows . $ 36.35 per 
4-5 cwt steers. 62.00 per 
4-5 cwt hei£ers . 54.50 per 
5-6 cwt steers. 56.00 per 
6-7 cwt steers. 57.00 per 
Al£al£a . 55.00 per 
Wheat . 4.12 per 











The land is £armed with the £allowing machinery which 
has the listed values: 
Pickup(3/4 ton> $8000 Truck (2 ton) $5000 
Tractor (110 hp) 20000 M. B. Plow 2000 
Tractor <BO hp) 12000 Tandem Disk 2000 
Stock Trailer 2000 Row Cultivator 1500 
Horse 800 Springtooth 2000 
0££set Disk 4000 Field Cultivator 1500 
Chisel 4000 Sprayer 1775 
Grain Drill 4500 Hay Baler 4500 
Combine 25000 Swather 10000 
The amount 0£ £amily labor available to the operation 
£or each month is: 
January 171 hours 
February 180 hours 
March 190 hours 
April 200 hours 
May 210 hours 
June 220 hours 
July 210 hours 
August 200 hours 
September 190 hours 
October 180 hours 
November 171 hours 
December 161 hours 
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Additional labor may be hired for $5 per hour. In 
addition to the machinery complement, the operator owns 160 
acres of land valued at $435 per acre. Total net worth is 
$180,175. Debt is limited to 50 percent of equity which is 
equivalent to limiting the debt-to-asset ratio to 33 
percent. The interest rate on all types of debt is 13 
percent. Additional land can be rented for $21.75 per 
acre, this is a weighted average of rental rates consisting 
of $8 per acre for pasture and $33 per acre for cropland. 
The operator is assumed to be capable of managing all 
enterprises. 
The Optimum Farm Organization 
The optimum farm organization was determined by using a 
single period linear programing model. The optimum 
solution required 925 acres of rental land in addition to 
the 160 acres of owned land. The capital requirement for 
operating activities is $175,158. The return to all land, 
all labor, and all capital is $74,241. 
activity organization is: 
198 head of Winter Stocker Steers 
738 head of Summer Stocker Steers 
488 acres of Native Grass 
99 acres of Small Grain Graze-out 
236 acres of Sudan Pasture 
262 acres of Wheat for Grain 
The optimum 
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The operating activities on a per-acre basis are: 
Native Grass . 450 acres 
Small Grain Graze-out . 092 acres 
Sudan Pasture . 217 acres 
Wheat . 241 acres 
Summer Stocker Steers .680 head 
Winter Stocker Steers .183 head 
The capital requirement £or one acre 0£ operating 
activity is $161.35 and the labor requirement is 2.27 hours 
per acre. The return to all labor, all capital, and the 
land £or one acre 0£ operating activity is $68.40 • 
Using the capital, labor, and gross margin estimates 
developed by the single period model in the multiperiod 
models does not require that the enterprise mix remain 
constant, but that the enterprises which may be used in the 
£uture, as a whole, have similar capital requirements, 
labor requirements, and gross margin per acre. Technol-
ogical or structural changes which would a££ect the level 
or ratio 0£ capital, labor, and gross margin per acre are 
not incorporated into the model. 
CHAPTER V 
MULTIPERIOD ANALYSIS OF RENT RESTRICTIONS 
Multiperiod linear programing models are used to 
determine how a £armer's land requirements change over the 
li£e 0£ the farm operation and what e££ect various rent 
restrictions have on earnings and £arm firm growth. 
Although the ope~ation may be expected to continue for many 
years, extending the planning horizon beyond a certain 
point has little impact. The discount rate used to value 
£uture earnings is an important £actor in determining the 
planning horizon. Increasing the discount rate quickly 
diminishes the importance 0£ activities in later years. 
The number 0£ periods within the planning horizon may 
also vary. Increasing the number 0£ periods in a planning 
horizon allows the solut~on to change more and increases 
the number of times earnings are compounded. A £ew long 
periods may be pre£erred i£ changes take place slowly in 
the type of operation being modeled. Decreasing the number 
0£ periods also decreases the complexity of the problem. 
Speci£ication 0£ the Model 
The planning horizon is modeled £or twenty years. 
Within the range 0£ relevant discount rates, activities 
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a£ter twenty years have little e££ect on the operation. 
The planning horizon consists 0£ ten 2-year periods, this 
prevents changes £ram occurring based on one year's outcome 
yet allows adequate £lexibility. 
Technical coe££icients and all prices except land prices 
are held constant through the periods, no technological or 
structural changes are incorporated into the model. Rather 
than in£lating prices and using nominal discount and 
interest rates, prices are held constant and real discount 
and interest rates are used. The real interest rate <the 
rate the £armer pays minus the in£lation rate> 
percent. 
is eight 
The discount rate used in the model is a real, be£ore-
tax, required rate 0£ return. 
atic risk 0£ an investment, 
Theoretically, the system-
the rate 0£ return on the 
market port£olio, and the rate 0£ return available on a 
risk-£ree asset determine the required rate 0£ return. 
When determining a discount rate £or a £arm operation, tax 
bene£its and non-monetary or indirect bene£its must also be 
considered. 
According to income estimates by Melichar, the real rate 
0£ return to assets in the £arm sector £rom 1945 to 1984 
was 4.21 percent, and the debt-to-asset ratio ranged £ram 9 
to 22 percent. In the operation being modeled, the 
required rate 0£ return must be more than 4.21 to compen-
sate £or the higher risk resulting £ram greater £inancial 
leverage. 
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Special tax laws applicable to agriculture may affect 
the appropriate before-tax discount rate. If the real, 
before-tax, discount rate is 4.8 percent under an effective 
tax rate of 10 percent, then the real, before-tax, discount 
rate would be 6.0 percent if the effective tax rate were 28 
percent. 
factors. 
The discount rate may be influenced by several 
The appropriate discount rate for an agricultural 
investment may be unique for each individual. The real, 
before-tax, discount rate used in the multiperiod models is 
6 percent. 
The initial resources available to the operation include 
160 acres of owned land, $110,575 of available capital, 
$90,087 of debt capacity, and 2,283 hours per year of 
family labor. Labor can be hired for $5 per hour. Land 
can be rented for $21.75 per acre. Land may be purchased 
with cash or by paying 50 percent down and borrowing the 
balance with an amortized loan for 30 years at 8 percent 
interest. 
Five different assumptions concerning land prices will 
be used to analyze the effects of six levels of rent 
restrictions. Real capital gains <losses> increase 
(decrease> the operation's debt capacity and increase 
<decrease> earnings. Real capital gains are valued as cash 
income, this implies that the n variable, described in 
chapter three, equals one. 
Although there is expected to be a high correlation 
between rental rates and land prices, there is not a strict 
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relationship. Real land prices are based on the land's 
expected £uture earnings which consist 0£ real capital 
gains and rental income. Rental rates have historically 
ranged £ram 3 to 7.5 percent 0£ land values. The price 0£ 
land can be changed without changing the rental rate or 
other coe££icients, but the ratio 0£ rent to price should 
remain within the normal range 0£ 3 to 7.5 percent. 
The land price is initially $435 per acre in all models. 
In Model One, the land price is held constant at $435 per 
acre, rent is £ive percent 0£ the land price. The land 
price increases two percent each year in Model Two, the 
land price reaches $646.39 per acre at the end 0£ year 
twenty, the rent is 3.36 percent 0£ $646.39 In Model 
Three, the land price decreases two percent each year, the 
land price at the end 0£ year twenty is $290.41 per acre, 
rent is 7.5 percent 0£ the price at the end 0£ the planning 
horizon. 
In Models Four and Five, land prices decrease $60 in 
year one and $40 in year two then increase in subsequent 
years. The land price at the beginning 0£ period two is 
$335, rent is 6.5 percent 0£ the land price. The land 
price increases two percent each year a£ter year two in 
Model Four, the price at the end 0£ the planning horizon is 
$478.46, rent is 4.54 percent 0£ the price at the end 0£ 
year twenty. The land price increases four percent 
annually a£ter dropping to $335 in Model Five. The price 
of land at the end of year twenty is $678.65, 
percent of price. 
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rent is 3.2 
Each model is run first with no rent restrictions, then 
rent restrictions are set at an additional 160 acres, 320 
acres, 480 acres, 640 acres, and 800 acres per period for 
each model. 
Explanation of Tableau Coefficients 
A two period block of the tableau for two percent real 
capital gains and rent restrictions of an additional 160 
acres every two years is shown in figure 7, the complete 
tableau is shown in Appendix C. 
LANDl is a technical restriction row that limits the use 
of land in period one to 160 acres plus any rented or 
purchased land. The operating activity COPERl> uses one 
acre 0£ land. Land buy with cash <LANDBCl>, land buy with 
loan <LANDBLl>, and land rent <LANDRl> are all activities 
which increase the availability 0£ land in period one. I£ 
land is bought in period one, it is available in subsequent 
periods. 
RENT RESTRICTIONl is an imposed restriction limiting the 
amount 0£ rented land to an additional 160 acres per 
period. If land is rented in period one <LANDRl>, that 
land is also available to be rented in period two in 
addition to the 160 acres 0£ newly available land. I£ no 
land is rented in period one, only 160 acres are available 
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LABORl is a technical restriction which limits £amily 
provided labor to 2283 hours per year. Each unit 0£ 
operating activity requires 2.27 hours 0£ labor. 
tional labor may be hired <LABHIRl> £or $5 per hour. 
Addi-
CAPITALl is a £inancial restriction which limits capital 
to $110,575 One unit 0£ operating activity requires 
$161.35 0£ operating, livestock, 
Land bought with cash requires $435 
bought with a loan requires $236.82 
and equipment capital. 
0£ capital and land 
0£ capital. A down 
payment 0£ $217.50 is made at the beginning 0£ year one and 
a $19.32 payment is made at the beginning 0£ year two. 
Land purchased with a loan requires $38.64 0£ capital £or 
payments in each £uture period <19.32 * 2>. Renting land 
requires $43.50 <21.75 * 2> 0£ capital per period and hired 
labor requires $10 <5 * 2> per period. Borrowing money 
<BORROWl> provides one dollar 0£ capital £or each dollar 
borrowed. 
DEBTl is a £inancial restriction used to limit borrowing 
to $90,087 which is hal£ 0£ equity. The operator's initial 
equity consists 0£ $110,575 in liquid assets plus 160 acres 
0£ land valued at $435 per acre. Total value 
is $69,600 and total equity is $180,175. 
activity uses one doliar 0£ available debt 
0£ the land 
The borrowing 
and the land 
purchased using a loan requires $217.50 0£ debt per acre in 
the £irst period and less in £uture periods as principal 
payments are made. The debt limitations 0£ subsequent 
periods are also a££ected by capital gains on owned land. 
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Two percent capital gains on $435 compounded annually £or 
two years is $17.57; this increases debt capacity in period 
two by $8.78 £or each acre 0£ land owned. 
to $91,492 (90,087 + (8.78 * 160)]. 
DEBT2 is limited 
Each acre 0£ land 
purchased using a loan in period one decreases debt 
capacity by the remaining principal balance 0£ $215.58 but 
increases debt capacity by hal£ 0£ capital gains which is 
$8.78 . The net effect of purchasing an acre of land using 
a loan, is to decrease debt capacity by $206.80 . 
NET RETURNl is an accounting row used to compute the 
di£ference between returns from the operating activity and 
cash payments for land loans, rented land, hired labor, and 
borrowed money. The EARNl activity accounts £or the 
di££erence between returns and expenses. 
FAMLIVl is an accounting row used to determine marginal 
family consumption CMARCONl> which is calculated as 
earnings minus $30,000 (fixed £amily living expenses for 
two years), divided by £our. The marginal propensity to 
consume earnings, 
expence, is .25 . 
net 0£ the required £amily living 
ACCAPl is an accounting row used to determine how much 
0£ the earnings generated in period one can be trans£erred 
to future periods. The amount of capital trans£erred 
<CAPTRANl> is calculated as earnings minus £ixed family 
living expenses, marginal family consumption, and capital 
used for land purchases. Each dollar of capital 
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trans£erred to future periods also adds S.50 of debt 
capacity in each period. 
Periods three through ten are affected by activities in 
period one in the same way period two is affected. 
Coefficients in subsequent debt rows change as principal 
payments are made and as capital gains from land occur. 
The columns pertaining to activities in period two through 
ten are similar to columns £or period one, except for the 
changes resulting from different land prices. 







assets <ASSCOUNT>, net worth 
<CAPGAIN> at the end of the 
planning horizon. The LANCOUNT row counts the land 
purchases and adds them to the originally owned 320 acres. 
LANDTOT is the accounting activity which shows the total 
acres owned at the end of the planning horizon. 
The DEBCOUNT row sums the outstanding balance of land 
loans at the end 0£ the planning horizon. Total debt at 
the end of the planning horizon is shown by the DEBTOT 
activity. The ASSCOUNT row adds the value of owned land 
and the capital trans£erred at the end of the tenth period 
to the available capital at the beginning of the tenth 
period. Total assets at the end of the planning horizon 
are shown as the ASSTOT activity. The NETCOUNT row is used 
to subtract total debt from total assets. The difference 
is shown by the NWTOT activity. The CAPGAIN row is used to 
sum the discounted value of capital gains from the land 
buying activities of each period. 
gains are shown as activity CGTOT. 
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The discounted capital 
The objective function row has discount factors in each 
earnings column and a one in the CGTOT column. The CGTOT 
column does not require a discount factor since capital 
gains are discounted in the CAPGAIN row. 
Results of the Multiperiod Models 
The availability of rental land is an important £actor 
in determining the earning capability and firm growth 0£ 
farmers. No land is purchased in any model when rental 
land is unrestricted. Returns on available capital are 
highest when land is rented and capital is used in the 
operating activity. 
land in period one. 
Each model uses 853 acres 0£ rented 
The additional land rented in period 
two ranges £ram 243 acres to 284 acres. Requirements £or 
rented land increase in £uture periods and are as high as 
2124 additional acres in period twenty <Model Two). The 
total acres operated in period one by each model is 1013 
acres, the total acres operated at the end 0£ the planning 
horizon range from 9311 
<Model Two). 
acres <Model Three) to 9571 acres 
The objective function value for Model One is 
$1,195,185: Model two is $1,204,658: Model Three is 
$1,187,178: Model Four is $1,184,751: and Model Five is 
$1,190,607. The objective function value and the amount of 
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TABLE III 
OBJECTIVE F~CTIIJ4 VALUE ~D ~D 
PURCK!ISE SlttlARY 
------------------------------------------------------
Rent Function Land 
Land Price Ass1111ption Restrict. Value Bought 
------------------------------------------------------
$435 and Constant None 1 ,195,185 8 
<Hodel One) 168 583,988 834 
328 813,622 931 
488 983,282 925 
648 1,864,253 834 
888 1,128,997 744 
$435 and Increases ZI. None 1,284,658 0 
<Hodel Two) 168 598,519 727 
328 824,342 798 
488 985,111 762 
648 1,867,627 691 
888 1,133,667 628 
$435 and Decreases ZI. None 1,1B7 ,178 8 
<Hodel Three) 168 497,347 8 
328 769,944 8 
488 964,572 8 
648 1,849,678 8 
888 1,115,374 8 
$435 then drop to $335 None 1,184,751 8 
and Increases 2i. 168 647,237 1,813 
<Hodel Four) 328 842,876 1,015 
488 995,813 969 
648 1,867,388 868 
888 1,128,766 752 
$435 then drop to $335 None 1,198,687 8 
and Increases 4% 168 676,825 922 
<Model Fi11e) 328 857 ,621 882 
488 1,888,566 889 
648 1,872,178 713 
888 1,133,566 619 
-------------------------------------------------------
53 
land purchased is shown in table III for all models and 
each level 0£ rent restriction. 
Restricting the amount 0£ rental land to an additional 
160 acres per period decreases the objective £unction value 
by as much as 58 percent <Model Three>. Shadow prices £or 
rental land, the amount the objective £unction values would 
increase if another acre 0£ rental land were available, are 
as high as $751 <Model Two>. Many 0£ the shadow prices are 
greater than the net return £rom renting an acre £or one 
period. This is possible since the amount of available 
land is dependent on the amount of land rented in previous 
periods. 
Restricting the amount of rental land to an additional 
320 acres per period decreases the objective function value 
from 28 percent <Model Five> to 35 percent <Model Three>. 
Shadow prices for rental land are as high as $483. Rent 
restrictions allowing a maximum 0£ 480 additional acres per 
period decrease the objective function value from 16 
percent <Models Four and Five> to 19 percent <Model Three). 
The highest shadow price for rental land is $301. The 
objective function value decreases just over 10 percent 
when rental land is restricted to an additional 640 acres 
per period. The highest shadow price is $243. With rental 
land restricted to an additional 800 acres per period the 
objective £unction values decrease from 4 to 6 percent. 
The highest shadow price for rental land is $254. 
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The most additional land rented in any period is 2,124 
acres. Rent restrictions 0£ 2,124 additional acres per 
period or more would not a££ect the objective £unction 
value 0£ any model. A summary 0£ results £or all models at 
each level 0£ rent restriction is shown in Appendix D. 
The various assumptions used regarding real land prices 
depict a variety 0£ possible land prices that may prevail 
at the £ixed rental rate and gross margin used in the 
models. Rent restrictions 0£ less than 2,066 additional 
acres per period decrease the objective £unction value 
under every land price assumption used in the analysis. 
Farm operators with more available capital would be 
adversely a££ected by rent restrictions higher than 2,066 
additional acres per period and £arm operators with less 
available capital would only be a££ected by rent restric-
tions 0£ less than 2,124 additional acres per period. 
The supply 0£ rental land varies among locations as does 
the degree to which such restrictions a££ect individual 
£armers. An increased supply 0£ rental land resulting £rom 
increased non£armer ownership 0£ £armland could signi£i-
cantly increase £armers' earnings in some areas. An 
increased supply 0£ rental land would be 0£ the most 
bene£it to beginning £armers and large, expanding £armers. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Farmers have relied on their own equity, debt, and 
leasing to meet their capital needs. Results 0£ the 
Oklahoma Farm Financial Surv~y, and similar surveys from 
other states, show that many farmers have debt levels which 
may cause moderate to severe £inancial stress. Some 
£armers must increase equity or decrease debt to alleviate 
the e££ects 0£ being over-leveraged. With limited amounts 
0£ owner-provided and outside equity available, t~e only 
alternative for some farmers is to sell assets and replace 
them with leased assets in order to maintain or increase 
the size 0£ the operation. 
Farmland constitutes approximately 75 percent 0£ 
£armers' assets and may be a suitable asset to sell and 
replace by leasing. Purchases 0£ £armland by individuals 
and/or institutional investors would provide equity to the 
£arm sector and reduce farmers' equity capital needs. The 
possibility 0£ individual and/or institutional investments 
in farmland providing a substantial source 0£ equity 
capital to the £arm sector is dependent on the risk-return 
characteristics 0£ farmland relative to alternative 
investments. An increase in available rental land 
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resulting £ram increased non-£armer ownership would 
increase £armers' earning potential. 
Results 0£ the Capital Asset Pricing Model show that, 
historically, £armland has had high returns relative to its 
systematic risk, but some assumptions 0£ the CAPM are 
violated by the unique characteristics 0£ £armland. 
Capital gains on £armland must be realized by selling the 
asset in a market that, at times, is not liquid and has 
high search and transaction costs. Assets in the market 
port£olio are traded in a liquid market and capital gains 
can easily be realized. The capital gains portion 0£ 
£armland earnings may be discounted by some unknown £actor 
between zero and one Cn> in order to make them comparable 
to cash earnings or capital gains on assets in the market 
port£olio. !£ capital gains on £armland are worth at least 
22.5 percent 0£ cash earnings, £armland meets the required 
rate 0£ return £or inclusion in the port£olio. 
Estimates 0£ beta derived £ram two di££erent time 
periods are signi£icantly di££erent. Feldstein's hypo-
thesis, that the real price 0£ land increases and the real 
price 0£ reproducible capital goods decreases during 
periods 0£ in£lation, 
beta to be unstable. 
suggests that in£lation may cause 
The upper bound 0£ the 90 percent 
con£idence interval £or any beta estimated is .1776 <1945 
to 1972>. The required rate 0£ return £or an asset with a 
beta 0£ .1776 is 6.10 percent, 
expected return £ram £armland. 
which is well below the 
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Farmland appears to be a suitable asset in a diversified 
port£olio based on historical trends. The beta value £or 
£armland may be unstable but it is low relative to expected 
earnings. Uncertainty about the value 0£ n prevents a 
de£inite conclusion. 
The effect on farm operators of increased non-farmer 
ownership of farmland depends upon the tenancy arrangement 
of £arms prior to being purchased by o£f-farm investors, 
current rent restrictions and farmers' objectives. If land 
is purchased from current operators t~e supply of rental 
land will increase. If the supply of rental land is not 
limiting to the farmer's objectives, an increase in the 
supply is little benefit. An increased supply of rental 
land may a£f ect a farmer in various ways depending on the 
farmer's objectives. If a farmer's objective is to 
maximize earnings and a limited supply of rental land 
effectively restricts the farmer, increases in the supply 
of rental land can substantially increase the farmer's 
objective function value~ 
When a farmer's objective is to maximize the present 
value of earnings over a planning horizon, all land is 
rented. Limiting the supply of rental land to an addi-
tional 160 acres every two years can reduce the objective 
function value by as much as 58 percent when available 
capital is $110,575. The amount of available capital and 
trends in the price of land influence the effect of rent 
restrictions. The shadow price £or an additional acre of 
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rental land is $751 when rental land is restricted to an 
additional 160 acres per year, available capital is 
$110,575 and the land price increases 2 percent each year 
£rom an initial price 0£ $435 per acre. Although several 
£actors in£luence the degree to which rent restrictions 
a££ect the objective £unction value, increasing the supply 
0£ rental land to £armers £acing rent restrictions clearly 
increases their earn~ng potential. The supply 0£ rental 
land is particularly important to beginning £armers and 
large, expanding £armers. 
Results 0£ the analysis show that £armland's risk-return 
characteristics make it a suitable addition to a diversi-
£ied port£olio. But £or £armers, the rate 0£ return to 
£armland is not su££icient to compensate £or the capital 
requirements 0£ purchasing land i£ an alternative exists to 
invest the 
activities. 
capital in additional units 0£ operating 
If the rate of return to £armland were higher 
than the rate 0£ return to the operating activities, land 
would be purchased in the unrestricted solutions. Since 
the operating activities are the only source 0£ cash 
income, rent restrictions would still decrease the objec-
tive £unction value. 
Implications for Further Research 
The feasibility 0£ non-£armer investments in £armland 
was analyzed by comparing the rate of return on farmland 
required by investors with a diversi£ied port£olio, to 
59 
farmland's expected rate of return. An alternative method 
would be to compare the rate of return required by non-
farmers to the rate of return required by farmers. 
Assuming farmers' portfolios are limited to agricultural 
assets, farmers' required rate of return could be deter-
mined using agricultural income estimates similar to those 
developed by Melichar. Such an analysis would also require 
the assumption that non-monetary and indirect benefits from 
land ownership are equal to non-monetary and indirect 
benefits from owning other agricultural assets. The 
investors for which the lowest value of n caused the 
expected value qf earnings to equal their required rate of 
return would be the likely purchasers of farmland, if the 
value of n £or £armers 
£armers. 
equals the value of n £or non-
Uncertainty about the value of n, the instability of 
beta, and the possibility 0£ in£lation, total variance, or 
the dividend-earnings ratio influencing the appropriate 
discount rate for farmland are of concern. The results of 
farmland investment analyses based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model may be inconclusive or misleading. Due to 
the unique characteristics of farmland, balancing the 
portfolio with a factor model may be a superior approach. 
The objective when constructing a portfolio with a factor 
model is to include assets which have opposite responses to 
what are determined to be key variables such as interest 
rates, oil prices, etc. A low beta value indicates that 
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farmland may be a suitable asset to include in a portfolio 
based on a factor model. 
It was assumed in the analysis that the supply of rental 
land increased, this required that the amount of operator-
owned land decreased. A transfer of land from farmers to 
non-farmers may be detrimental to farmers whose objectives 
include land ownership. If the expected rate of return to 
farmland is greater than the rate of return required by 
non-farmer investors, resulting increases in non-farmer 
purchases would cause the price of land to increase. Land 
purchases by farmers would be less feasible, but current 
owners would benefit from additional capital gains. If the 
non-monetary or indirect benefits to operators from owning 
land could be measured, those benefits could be incor-
porated in the objective functions of the multiperiod 
models. 
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OKLAHOMA STATUTORY TITLE 18 
CHAPTER 21.-FARMING OR RANCHING 
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 
Prohibition on £orming-Exceptions 
A. It is hereby declared to be the public policy 0£ 
this state and shall be the prohibition 0£ this act that, 
notwithstanding the provisions 0£ Section 5 0£ this act, no 
£oreign corporation shall be £ormed or licensed under the 
Oklahoma General Corporation Act £or the purpose 0£ 
engaging in £arming or ranching or £or the purpose 0£ 
owning or leasing any interest in land to be used in the 
business 0£ £arming or ranching. A domestic corporation 
may, however, be £ormed under the Oklahoma General Corpor-
ation Act to engage in such activity i£ the £allowing 
requirements are met by that domestic corporation: 
1. There shall be no shareholders other than <a> 
natural persons; Cb) estates; (c) trustees 0£ trusts £or 
the bene£it 0£ natural persons, i£ such trustees are either 
<i> natural persons or (ii) banks or trust companies which 
either have their principal place 0£ business in Oklahoma 
or are organized under the laws 0£ the State 0£ Oklahoma; 
or (d) corporations owned by no shareholders other than 
those described in paragraph 1 <a>, <b> or <c> 0£ this 
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section and meeting the requirements of paragraph 3 0£ this 
section. 
2. Not more than thirty-five percent C35X> of the 
corporation's annual gross receipts shall be from any 
source other than <a> farming or ranching or both, as the 
case may be, or (b) allowing others to extract from the 
corporate lands any minerals underlying the same, 
including, but not limited to, oil and gas. Provided, 
however, in the event a corporation does not comply with 
the thirty-five percent <35X) annual gross receipt test, 
then, in that event the corporation may £urnish records of 
its gross receipts for each of the previous five <5> years, 
or for each year that it has been in existence if less than 
£ive <5> years, and the average of said annual gross 
receipts shall be used in lieu of the corporation's annual 
gross receipts for purposes 0£ complying with this section. 
3. There shall not be more than ten shareholders unless 
said shareholders in excess of ten are related as lineal 
descendants or are or have been related by marriage to 
lineal descendants or persons related to lineal descendants 
by adoption or any combination of same. 
4. Certificates of incorporation for domestic 
corporations which intend to engage in farming or ranching 
or owning or leasing any interest in land to be used in the 
business of farming or ranching shall initially be approved 
by the State board of Agriculture concerning the purpose 
prior to filing in the office of the Secretary of State. 
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No stated purpose is to be disapproved by the Board of 
Agriculture unless such stated purpose violates existing 
civil or criminal code. 
B. The Secretary of State shall provide the State 
Department of Agriculture a list of corporations 
registering in the state that list farming or ranching or 
owning or leasing any interest in land to be used in the 
business of farming or ranching at least weekly. 
§ 952. 
A. 
Revocation of licence-Vacation of franchise-
Penal ties 
Any license issued after June 1, 1971, under the 
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act to a foreign corporation 
for the purpose of engaging in farming or ranching or for 
the purpose of owning or leasing any interest in land to be 
used in the business of farming or ranching shall be 
revoked within five <5> ye~rs of the effective date of this 
act. 
B. The corporate franchise of any existing domestic 
corporation formed under the Oklahoma Business Corporation 
Act after June 1, 1971, for the purpose of engaging in 
farming or ranching or for the purpose of owning or leasing 
any interest in land to be used in the business of farming 
or ranching shall be vacated within five <5> years of the 
effective date of this act unless its articles of 
incorporation comply with Section 951 of this title. 
C. The corporate franchise of any domestic corporation 
governed by the Oklahoma General Corporation Act formed for 
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the purposes of farming or ranching or for the purpose of 
owning or leasing any interest in land to be used in the 
business of farming or ranching and permitted to engage in 
such activity under this act shell be vacated promptly in 
the manner prescribed by Section 104 of this act, if the 
corporation has persistently violated the provisions of 
subsection A of Section 951 of this title. 
D. The State Board 0£ Agriculture shall initiate and 
prosecute civil or criminal actions and proceedings when 
deemed necessary to en£orce or carry out any of the 
provisions of this code. 
E. This act shall not require any foreign or domestic 
corporation to dispose of any property acquired on or 
be£ore June 1, 1971. 
F. Any £arming or ranching corporation which violates 
the provisions 0£ Section 951 0£ this title shall be fined 
an amount not to exeed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00>. Any 
other person, corporation 6r entity who knowingly violates 
such section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 
§ 953. Actions £or divestment 0£ interests in land held by 
a corporation-Exemptions-Dissolution of 
corporation 
A. No corporation organized for a purpose other than 
farming or ranching shall own, lease or hold, directly or 
indirectly, agricultural lands in excess of that amount 
reasonably necessary to carry out its business purpose. 
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B. Any resident 0£ the county in which the land is 
situated, who is 0£ legal age, may initiate an action £or 
the divestment 0£ an interest in land held by a corporation 
in violation 0£ the provisions of Sections 951 through 954 
of this title, in the county in which the land is situated. 
If such action is successful all costs of the action shall 
be assessed against the de£endant corporation and a 
reasonable attorney's £ee shall be allowed the plainti££, 
and should judgment be rendered for the de£endant, such 
costs and a reasonable attorney's £ee for the defendant 
shall be paid by the plainti££. 
C. In the event an action for the divestment of an 
interest in the land held by a corporation in violation 0£ 
the provisions of Sections 951 through 954 of this title, 
is success£ul against said corporation, said corporation 
shall be required to dispose of said land within such 
reasonable period of time as may be ordered by the court, 
subject to the corporation's right of appeal. The 
provisions 0£ Sections 951 through 954 of this title, shall 
not apply to corporations engaging in £ood canning 
operations, food processing or frozen £ood pocessing 
insofar as such corporations engage in the raising 0£ £ood 
products for aforesaid purposes. 
D. Upon the petition to a court of competent 
jurisdiction by shareholders holding twenty-five percent 
<25%> or more 0£ the shares in a £arming or ranching 
business corporation the court in its discretion, for good 
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cause shown, may order the corporation dissolved and the 
assets 0£ such corporation divided in kind pro rata to the 
shareholders or liquidated and the proceeds 0£ such 
liquidation divided pro rata to the shareholders all 
according to the procedures set out £or the dissolution and 
liquidation 0£ business corporations under the Oklahoma 
General Corporation Act. 
§ 954. Research or £eeding operations-Exemption 
The provisions 0£ this act shall not apply where a 
corporation, either domestic or £oreign, engages in 
research and/or £eeding arrangements or operations 
concerned with the £eeding 0£ livestock or poultry, but 
only to the extent 0£ such research and/or feeding 
arrangements or such livestock or poultry operations, or 
engages in £orestry as de£ined by Section 2, Chapter 242, 
O.S.L.1968 (2 O.S.Supp. § 1-4>, or whose corporate purpose 
is charitable or eleemosynary. 
§ 955. Limitations on ownership-Exceptions 
A. No person, corporation, association or any other 
entity shall engage in £arming or ranching, or own or lease 
any interest in land to be used in the business 0£ farming 
or ranching, except the £allowing: 
1. Natural persons and the estates 0£ such persons; 
2. Trustees 0£ trusts; provided that 
a each bene£iciary shall be a person or entity . 
enumerated in paragraphs 1 through 4 0£ this 
subsection, and 
b there shall not be more than ten bene£iciaries 
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unless the bene£iciaries in excess 0£ ten are 
related as lineal descendants or are or have been 
related by marriage or adoption to lineal 
descendants, and 
c at least sixty-£ive percent (65Y.> 0£ the trust's 
annual gross receipts shall be derived £ram 
£arming or ranching, or £ram allowing others to 
extract minerals underlying lands held by the 
trust. I£ the trust cannot comply with the annual 
gross receipt test, the trust may £urnish records 
0£ its gross receipts £or each 0£ the previous 
£ive <5> years, or £or each year that it has been 
in existence i£ less than £ive <5> years, and the 
average 0£ such annual gross receipts may be used 
£or purposes 0£ complying with this section; 
3. Corporations, as provided £or in Sections 951 
through 954 0£ Title 18 0£ the Oklahoma Statutes, or as 
otherwise permitted by law; 
4. Partnerships and limited partnerships; provided 
that 
a each partner shall be a person or entity 
enumerated in paragraphs 1 through 4 0£ this 
subsection, and 
b there shall not be more than ten partners unless 
B. 
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said partners in excess 0£ ten are related as 
lineal descendants or are or have been related by 
marriage or adoption to lineal descendants, and 
c at least sixty-£ive percent C65X> 0£ the partner-
ship's annual gross receipts shall be derived £ram 
£arming or ranching, or £ram allowing others to 
extract minerals underlying lands held by the 
partnership. I£ the partnership cannot comply 
with the annual gross receipt test, the 
partnership may £urnish records 0£ its gross 
receipts £or each 0£ the previous £ive (5) years, 
or £or each year that it has been in existence 1£ 
less than £ive <5> years, and the average 0£ such 
annual gross receipts may be used £or the purposes 
0£ complying with this section. 
Any £arming or ranching corporation, trust, 
partnership, limited partnership or other entity which 
violates any provisions 0£ this section shall be £ined an 
amount not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00). Any 
other person or entity who knowingly violates this section 
shall be deemed guilty 0£ a misdemeanor. 
C. The provisions 0£ this act shall not apply to 
interests in land acquired prior to June 1, 1978. 
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§ 956. Action £or divestment-Cost-Attorney £ees 
A. Any resident 0£ the county in which the land is 
situated, who is 0£ legal age, may initiate an action in 
the district court in the county wherein the land is 
situated £or the divestment 0£ an interest in land held in 
violation 0£ Section 1 0£ this act. I£ such action is 
success£ul, all costs 0£ the action shall be assessed 
against the de£endant and a reasonable attorney £ee shall 
be allowed £or the plainti££, and, should judgment be 
rendered £or the de£endant, such costs and a reasonable 
attorney £ee £or the de£endant shall be paid by the 
plainti££. 
B. In the event an action £or the divestment 0£ an 
interest in land held in violation of Section 1 0£ this act 
is successful, the defendant shall be required to dispose 
0£ said land within such reasonable period of time as may 
be ordered by the court, subject to the right of appeal of 
said defendant. 
Section 1020 of Title 18 speci£ies penalties and methods 
of enforcement. ) 
§ 1. 
OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XXII 
ALIEN AND CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 
OF LANDS 
Aliens-Ownership 0£ land prohibited-Disposal 0£ 
lands acquired 
No alien or person who is not a citizen 0£ the United 
States, shall acquire title to or own land in this state, 
and the Legislature shall enact laws whereby all persons 
not citizens 0£ the United States, and their heirs, who may 
herea£ter acquire real estate in this state by devise, 
descent, or otherwise, shall dispose 0£ the same within 
£ive years upon condition 0£ escheat or £or£eiture to the 
State: Provided, This shall not apply to Indians born 
within the United States, nor to aliens or persons not 
citizens 0£ the United States who may become bona £ide 
residents 0£ this State: And Provided Further, That this 
section shall not apply to lands now owned by aliens in 
this State. 
§ 2. Corporations-Buying, acquiring or dealing in real 
estate 
No corporation shall be created or licensed in this 
State £or the purpose 0£ buying, acquiring, trading, or 
dealing in real estate other than real estate located in 
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incorporated cities and towns and as additions thereto; nor 
shall any corporation doing business in this State buy, 
acquire, trade, or deal in real estate £or any purpose 
except such as may be located in such towns and cities arid 
as additions to such towns and cities, and further except 
such as shall be necessary and proper for carrying on the 
business £or which it was chartered or licensed; and 
provided £urther that under limitations prescribed by the 
legislature, any corporation may acquire real estate £or 
lease or sale to any other corporation, if such latter 
corporation could have legally acquired the same in the 
£irst instance; nor shall any corporation be created or 
licensed to do business in this State £or the purpose 0£ 
acting as agent in buying and selling or leasing land for 
agricultural purposes: provided, however, that corporations 
shall not be precluded from taking mortgages on real estate 
to secure loans or debts, or from acquiring title thereto 
upon foreclosure of such mortgages or in the collection of 
debts, conditioned that such corporation or corporations 
shall not hold such real estate £or a longer period than 
seven (7) years after acquiring such title; and provided, 
further, that this Section shall not apply to trust 
companies taking only the naked title to real estate in 
this State as a trustee, to be held solely as security for 
indebtedness pursuant to such trust; and provided, further, 
that no public service corporation shall hold any land, or 
the title thereof, in any way whatever in this State, 
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except as the same shall be necessary for the transaction 
and operation of its business as such public service 
corporation. 
[ Amended by State Question No. 358, Referendum Petition 




BUDGET CODE IO B008LV13 
STOCKER STEERS 
BUY 500# IN MAY 
SELL 690# IN OCTOBER 










SALT & MIN. 




MACH & FUEL & LUBE 
MACHINERY REPAIR COST 
EQUIPMENT REPAIR 






















PRICE VALUE/UNIT VALUE YOUR VALUE 
57.000 393.30 385.43 ----------· 
385.43 ----------
TOTAL 
UNITS PRICE VALUE ----------5.000 56.00 280.00 ----------· 12.500 0.09 !. 12 ----------· 1.000 3.00 3.00 ----------
11.900 1.00 11.90 ----------1.000 3.50 3.50 ----------o.ooo 42.00 0.00 ----------· 
2.98 ----------2.03 ----------
0.05 ----------304.58 ----------
RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERV,OVERHEAO,RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 80.85 ----------
CAPITAL COST 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 





RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,MACHINERY,OVERHEAD,RISK,ANO MANAGEMENT 
OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES, INSURANCE) 
MACHINERY COL. 
EQUIPMENT COL. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 




LI VE STOCK LABOR 
TOTAL LABOR COST 





























BUDGET CODE IO B009LV13 
100 HEAD STOCKER BUDGET, PER HEAD 
BUY OCT 15 - SELL MARCH I: STEERS 
400# IN - 602# OUT 





PRODUCTION UNITS OUANTI TV WEIGHT 
6.02 





CWT. I .00 57.000 343.14 
RATE NUMBER TOTAL 
OPERATING INPUTS UNITS PER UNIT OF UNITS UNITS 
STR CALVES(4-500 CWT. 1.02 4.00 4.080 
41-45% PRO. SUP. LBS. 50.00 I .00 50.000 
SALT & MIN. LBS. 9.00 1.00 9.000 
TRUCKING HO. 2.00 1.00 2.000 
SALES COMM. HO. 1.00 1.00 1.000 
VET MEO I CINE HD. 1.00 I. 00 I .000 
UTILITIES HD. o. 15 1.00 0.150 
HAY CWT. 5.50 1.00 5.500 
MACH & FUEL & LUBE 
MACHINERY REPAIR COST 
EQUIPMENT REPAIR 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 
RETURNS TO LANO,LABOR,CAPITAL,M~CHINERY.DVERHEAD.RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST PRICE 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL o. 130 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 0.130 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT o. 130 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,MACHINERV,OVERHEAD,RISK,AND MANAGEMENT 
OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, 
MACHINERY 
EQUIPMENT 









TOTAL LABOR COST 



















































•••NO NAME CHANGES HAVE BEEN STORED WITH THIS BUDGET••• 
•••NO COMPLEMENT CHANGES HAVE BEEN STORED WITH THIS BUDGET••• 
BUDGET CODE ID•B007LVl3 
too HEAO STOCKER BUOGET, PER HEAD 
BUY OCT 15 - SELL MAY 15: STEERS 
4006 IN - 7016 OUT, GRAZE-OUT - WHEAT 





------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LIVESTOCK INVESTMENT UNITS 
HORSE HO. 

















PRICE VALUE/UNIT VALUE YOUR VALUE 
57.000 399.57 399.57 ----------· 
399.57 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------··-----RATE NUMBER TOTAL 
OPERATING INPUTS UNITS PER UNIT OF UNITS UNITS 
STR CALVES(4-500 CWT. 1.02 4.00 4.080 
PRAIRIE HAY TONS 0.15 1.00 0.150 
21-25% PRO. SUP. LBS. 100.00 1.00 100.000 
SALT & MIN. LBS. 19.00 1.00 19.000 
TRUCKING HO. 1.00 1.00 1.000 
SALES COMM. HO. 1.00 1.00 1.000 
VET & MEO. HO. 1.00 1.00 1.000 
UTILITIES HO. o. 15 1.00 0.150 
MACH & FUEL & LUBE 
MACHINERY REPAIR COST 
EQUIPMENT REPAIR 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 
RETURNS TO LANO,LABOR,CAPITAL.MACHINERY,OVERHEAO,RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST PRICE 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL o. 130 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT o. 130 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 0.130 
LIVESTOCK INVESTMENT 0.130 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 









TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 





TOTAL LABOR COST 


























6.30 ----------· 7 .20 ----------· 
I. 71 
__________ .. 
2.70 ----------5.10 ----------3.50 ----------o. 15 ----------4.56 ----------3. 11 ----------2.27 ----------289.56 ----------
110.01 ----------
VALUE YOUR VALUE 
21.87 ----------













BUDGET CODE ID B006LVtt BUDGET NUMBER 1tltl018 
COW-CALF COSTS & RETURNS PER COW 
too cow UNIT SIZE. SPRING CALVING 
NATIVE PASTURE 





































------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PRODUCTION UNITS QUANTITY WEIGflT PRICE VALUE/UNIT 
STR CALVES(4-500 CWT. 0.44 5.06 62.000 
HFR CALVES(4-500 CWT. 0.32 4.78 54.500 
COMMERCIAL COWS CWT. o. 10 9.50 36.350 
AGED BULLS CWT. o.ot 16.00· 45.ooo 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 
RATE NUMBER TOTAL 
OPERATING INPUTS UNITS PER UNIT OF UNITS UNITS 
41-45% PRO. SUP. LBS. 302.00 I. 12 338.240 
PRAIRIE HAY TONS 0. 16 t. 12 o. 179 
SALT & MIN. LBS. 24.00 t. 12 26.880 
VET & MED. HO. 1.00 t. 12 t. 120 
HAULING & MKTG. HD. t.00 1.00 1.000 
PERSONAL TAXES HD. 1.00 1.00 1.000 
MACH & FUEL & LUBE 
MACHINERY REPAIR COST 
EQUlPMt:NT REPAIR 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 
RETURNS TO LANO,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY,OVERHEAD,RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST PRICE 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL o. 130 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT o. 130 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT o. 130 
LIVESTOCK INVESTMENT o. 130 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 









TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 





TOTAL LABOR COST 


























VALUE YOUR VALUE 
138.04 ----------· 83.45 ----------· 34.53 ----------· 7.20 ----------· 263.22 ----------
VALUE ----·-----30.44 ----------· 




4 .02· ----------70.40 ----------
192.82 ----------


















BUDGET CODE ID B0020281 
ALFALFA HAY, DRVLAND 
LOAM SOIL 















TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. FUEL & LUBE 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 

















RETURNS TO LANO,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHF.AD,RISK.AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 






























----------------------------------------------------------------------------RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES, INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LANO, LABOR, OVERHEAD, 









RETURNS TO LAND, OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LANO CHARGE OR·RENT: 
LANO INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 
RETURNS TO OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
OWN MACHINERY 






















BUDGET CODE ID B0030276 
WHEAT FDR GRAIN OWN HARVEST EQUIPMENT 
SMALL GRAIN CLAY AND LOAM SOILS 












TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. FUEL & LUBE 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 













RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINE~Y. 
OVERHEAD.RISK.AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
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VALUE YOUR VALUE 



















OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES. INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, OVERHEAD, 









RETURNS TO LAND. OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 
RETURNS TO OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
100# 18-46-0 FALL 
40# NITROGEN SPPING 














0.00 -----o.oo ____ _ 
o.oo ____ _ 
51.06 -----
HININGER, HAMILTON 
11/0~i~S 1 1 00000000 
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BUDGET CODE ID B0040273 
GRAIN SORGHUM 
BUOGET NUMBER 73120904 















TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. FUEL & LUBE 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 



















RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR.CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAO,RISK,AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 












RETURNS TO LAND. LABOR, OVERHEAD, 









RETURNS TO LAND, OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LANO TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 
RETURNS TO OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 

















































BUDGET CODE ro B0050289 
SMALL GRAIN GRAZE-OUT 
LOAM SOILS 













TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 









RETURNS TO LAND.LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD.RISK.AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 









OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES. INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, OVERHEAD, 
RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LABOR COST: 
MACHINERY LABOR 
TOTAL LABOR COST 
HR. 5.000 
RETURNS TO LAND, OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 




















































TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 









RETURNS TO LANO,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD.RISK.AND MANAGEMENT . 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
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VALUE YOUR VALUE 
o.oo _____ .. 
0.00 -----













OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES, INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LAND, L~BOR, OVERHEAD. 









RETURNS TO LANO, OVERHEAD. RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR. RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES . 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 






















BUDGET CODE ID BOOtOt85 LAND GROUP Ot BUDGET NUMBER 85230t0t 
NATIVE GRASS PASTURE 
YEAR-ROUND GRAZING 
GOOD TO EXCELLENT RANGE CONDITIONS 






TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. FUEL & LUBE 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 







RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD,RISK,AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 






OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES, INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, OVERHEAD, 
RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LABOR COST: 
MACHINERY LABOR 
TOTAL LABOR COST 
HR. 5.000 
RETURNS TD LAND, OVFRHEAD, RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 
RETURNS TO OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
PASTURE UTILIZED 12 MOS. 










































BUDGET CODE ID B0140287 
CROP COVER 






TRACTOR FUEL & LUBE 
TRACTOR REPAIR COST 
EQUIP. REPAIR COST 






RETURNS TO LAND,LABOR,CAPITAL,MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD,RISK,AND MANAGEMENT 
CAPITAL COST: 
ANNUAL OPERATING CAPITAL 
TRACTOR INVESTMENT 
EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT 
TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, MACHINERY, 
OVERHEAD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
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OWNERSHIP COST: (DEPRECIATION, TAXES, INSURANCE) 
TRACTOR HR. 
EQUIPMENT HR. 
TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
RETURNS TO LAND, LABOR, OVERHEAD, 
RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LABOR COST: 
Ml\CHINERY LABOR 
TOTAL LABOR COST 
HR. 5.000 
RETURNS TO LAND, OVERHEllD, RISK AND MANAGEMENT 
LAND CHARGE OR RENT: 
LAND INVESTMENT 
LAND TAXES 
TOTAL LAND CHARGE 
ACRE 
ACRE 
RETURNS TO OVERHEAD, RISK ANO MANAGEMENT 




















MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAMMING TABLEAU 
WITH TWO PERCENT INCREASE IN LAND 




FLP1RR1 mx1n12E LinlT OPERl LftNDBCl LANDBLl LANDRl LABHIRl BORROl.ll ERRNl nARCONl CAPTRl OPER2 LANDBC2 
Htl>CEfRN <RHS> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9165 0 0 0 0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LRNDl L 160 1 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES1 L 160 1 
LABOR1 L 2283 2.27 -1 
CRP1 L 110575 161.35 435 236.82 43.5 10 -1 
DEBTl L 90087 217.5 1 
NETRET1 G 0 136.8 -19.32 -43.5 -10 -0.1664 -1 
FtlnLll.'1 L 30000 1 -4 
ACCAP1 G 30000 -435 -217 .s 1 -1 -1 
LtlND2 L 160 -1 -1 1 -1 
RENRES2 L 160 -1 
LABOR2 L 2283 2.27 
CtlP2 L 110575 38.64 -1 161.35 453 
DEBT2 L '91492 -8.78 206.8 -o.s 
NETRET2 G 0 -38.64 136.8 
FAHLll.'2 L 30000 
ACCftP2 G 30000 -453 
LAND3 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES3 L 160 
LABOR3 L 2283 
CtlP3 L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT3 L '92956 -17 .93 193.34 -o.s -9.14 
NETRET3 G 0 -38.64 
FAnLll.'3 L 30000 
ACCftP3 G 30000 
LAND4 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES4 L 160 
LtlBOR4 L 2283 
CAP4 L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT4 L 94479 -27.45 178.79 -o.s -18.66 
NETRET4 G 0 -38.64 
FAHLllJ4 .L 30000 
ACCAP4 G 30000 
LANDS L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRESS L 160 
LABORS L 2283 
CAPS L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBTS L '96063 -37.35 163.02 -o.s -28.56 
NETRETS G 0 -::S8.64 
FAHLllJS L 30000 
ACCftPS G ::soooo 
LAND6 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES6 L 160 
LtlBORb L 2283 l.O 
0 
===========s======K=========================·==·============··=··=====s=mm:======-==================-=s=============== 
MXIftIZE un1r OPERl LAt4DBC1 LAHDBLl LAHDRl LABHIR1 BORRO&U EARNl ftARCOHl CAPTRl OPER2 L~DBC2 
<RHS> 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.CJ165 0 0 0 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CAP6 L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT6 L 97711 -47.65 145.87 -0.5 -38.86 
NETRET6 G 0 -38.64 
FAftLIV6 L 30000 
ACCAP6 G 30000 
LAND7 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES7 L 160 
LABOR7 L 2283 
CAP? L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT7 L 99426 -58.37 127.17 -o.s -4-j.53 
NETRET7 G 0 -38.64 
FAftLIV7 L 30000 
ACCAP7 G 30000 
LANDS L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES8 L 160 
LABORS L 2283 
CAPS L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBTS L 101209 -6'9.51 106.72 -0.5 -60.72 
NETRET8 .G 0 -38.64 
FAnLIU8 L 30000 
ACCAP8 6 30000 
LAND'9 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES9 L 160 
LABOR9 L 2283 
CAP9 L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT9 L 103082 -81.22 84.15 -0.5 -72.43 
NETRET9 G 0 -38.64 
FAnLIU9 L 30000 
ACCAP'9 6 30000 
LAND10 L 160 -1 -1 -1 
REt~RESlO L 160 
LABOR10 L 2283 
CAP10 L 110575 38.64 -1 
DEBT10 L 105012 -'93.38 59.32 -0.5 -84.49 
NETRETlO G 0 -38.64 
FAftLIUlO L 30000 
ACCAP10 G 30000 
LANCOONT G 160 -1 -1 -1 
DEBCOONT L 0 137.92 
ASSCOONT 6 213997.4 -646.39 -646.39 -1 -646.39 
NETCOONT L 0 
CAPCOONT E 0 116.74 116.74 100.64 













































LANDBL2 LANDR2 LABHIR2 BORROM2 




246.S7 43.S 10 -1 
226.S 1 
















EARN2 nARCON2 CAPTR2 
0.816 0 0 
-1 
1 -4 







OPER3 LANDBC3 LANDBL3 LAl't1R3 LABHIR3 BORROU3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -1 -1 -1 
1 
2.27 -1 
161.3S 470 2SS.87 43.5 10 -1 
23S 1 

























































LANDBL2 LANDR2 LABHIR2 BORROM2 
























EftRN2 nARCON2 CAPTR2 












OPER3 LAN>BC3 LANDBL3 LANDR3 LABHIR3 BORROM3 






































































EARN3 MARCON3 CAPTR3 
0.726. 0 0 
-1 
1 -4 





OPER4 LftNDBC4 LANDBL4 LANDR4 LABHIR4 BORROM4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -1 -1 -1 
1 
2.27 -1 
16.1.35 489 26.6..22 43.5 10 -1 
244.5 1 








EARN4 nARCON4 CAPTR4 
0.646 0 0 
-1 
1 -4 






















































EARN3 nARCON3 CAPTR3 












OPER4 LAHDBC4 LANDBl.4 LANDR4 LABHIR4 BORROM4 
























EARN4 MARCOH4 CAPTR4 




























































LANDBCS LANDBLS LANDRS LABHIRS BORROM5 
















EARNS rtARCON5 CAPTRS 






OPER6 LftNOBC6 LANDBL6 LANDR6 LABHIR6 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 
2.21 





LANOBC5 LANOBL5 LANDR5 LRBHIR5 BORROLl5 EARNS 11ARCON5 CAPT RS OPER6 LANDBC6 LAN08L6 LANOR6 Lft8HIR6 
0 0 0 0 0 0.575 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CAP6 45.22 -1 161.35 530 288.54 43.5 10 
DEBf6 -10.3 241.95 -0.5 265 
NETRET6 -45.22 136.8 -23.54 -43.5 -10 
FAnLIU6 
ACCAP6 -530 -265 
LAN07 -1 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES7 -1 
LABOR? 
CRP7 45.22 -1 47.08 
OEBT7 -21.02 226.19 -0.5 -10.72 251.94 
NET REH -45.22 -47.08 
FRnLW7 
ACCAP7 
LANDS -1 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES8 
LABORS 
CAPS 45.22 -1 47.08 
DEBf 8 -32.16 209.16 -0.5 -21.86 235.55 
NETRET8 -45.22 -47.08 
FAnLIIJ8 
AC CAPS 
LAND'9 -1 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES9 
LABOR9 
CAP9 45.22 -1 47.08 
DEBf9 -43.87 190.58 -0.5 -:33.57 217.71 
NETRET'9 -45.22 -47.08 
FRnLIV9 
ACCAP9 
LRND10 -1 -1 -1 -1 
RENRES10 
LABOR10 
CRP10 45.22 -1 47.08 
DEBflO -55.93 170.52 -0.5 -45.63 198.5 
NETRET10 -45.22 -47.08 
FRnLIIJ10 
ACCAP10 
LRNCOUNT -1 -1 -1 -1 
DEBCOUNT 217.1 235.79 
ASSCOUNT -646.39 -646.39 -1 -646.39 -646.39 
NETCOUNf 



















































EARN6 nARCON6 CAPTR6 















OPER7 LANDBC7 LANDBL7 LANDR7 LABHIR7 BORROY7 EARN7 nARCON7 CflPTR7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4555 0 0 
1 -1 -1 -1 
1 
2.27 -1 
161.35 551 299.97 43.5 10 -1 
275.5 1 
136.S -24.47 -43.5 -10 -0.1664 -1 
1 -4 































































OPER8 LflNDBC8 L~DBL8 L~DR8 LABHIR8 BORROM8 EARNS nARCON8 Cfl>TR8 OPER9 LANDBC9 LANDBL9 LANDR9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4055 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -1 -1 -1 
1 
2.27 -1 
161.35 574 312.49 43.5 10 -1 
287 1 
136.8 -25.49 -43.5 -10 -0.1664 -1 
1 -4 
-574 -287 1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 1 
2.27 
50.9S -1 161.35 597 325.01 43.S 
-11.71 272.76 -0.5 298.5 
-50.98 136.S -26.51 -43.5 
-597 -298.5 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 
50.9S -1 53.02 
-23.77 255.01 -0.5 -12.06 2S3.81 
-50.98 -53.02 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
272.14 289.95 
-646.39 -646.39 -1 -646.39 -646.39 














































LABHIR9 BORROM9 EARN9 nARCON9 CAPTR9 OPER10 LflNDBC10 LANOBL10 LANDR10 LABHIRlO BORROM10 EARNlO nARCON10 























338.08 43.5 10 -1 
310.5 1 
-27.58 -43.5 -10 -O.lt.64 -1 
1 -4 


















































CAPTR10 . LANTOT DEBTOT ASSTOT 

















SUMMARY OF LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
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TABLE IV 
SlJtlARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE HELD C~STANT 
~D RENTAL LAND ltfRESTRICTED 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shadoit Price 

































Sllt!ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LctND PRICE HELD C~STANT 
AND 160 ACRE RENT RESTRICTI(t.I 
Land Land Bought Land Sought ShadlM Price 
Earnings Rented I.Ji th Cash lJ i th Loan Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 $41,457 160 40 687 
2 63,404 320 115 349 
3 75,232 480 21 233 
4 91,251 640 24 161 
5 104,805 aoo 46 106 
6 120,073 960 63 78 
7 137,491 1120 85 56 
a 158,756 1280 106 36 
9 181,429 1440 151 21 




S~RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGR#! RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE HELD ClliST~ 
AND 320 ACRE RENT RESTRICT!~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadOCll Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 158,969 320 17 66 394 
2 80,038 640 262 
3 100,004 960 154 
4 119,328 1280 10 141 
5 141,415 1600 42 107 
6 166,581 1920 71 78 
7 195,283 2240 107 56 
8 229,897 2560 142 36 
9 267,351 2880 211 21 




SlM'lARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGIWI RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL !J41lD PRICE HELD ClliSTAtIT 
AND 480 ACRE RENT RESTRICT!Ct4 
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadOlrl Price 
Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ·$64' 414 480 285 
2 94, 106 960 n 
3 114 ,540 1340 
4 135,754 1800 
5 169,087 2281 88 
6 203,004 2761 76 78 
7 241,541 :3241 111 56 
a 287,709 :3721 164 36 
9 338 ,096 4201 251 21 
10 394,614 4681 323 8 
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TABLE 1Jl I I 
Sltt1ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGP.AM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE HELD CctlSTtWr 
~D 640 ACRE RENT RESTRICTICN 
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadCNt Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
1 '$73 ,888 640 234 
2 98,880 1070 
3 118,624 1410 
4 144,028 1848 
5 172,253 2475 
6 217,490 3115 70 
7 263,008 3755 105 56 
8 316,666 4395 147 36 
9 376,230 5035 248 21 
10 443,065 5675 334 8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE IX 
SIJt!ARY OF MULiIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE HELD CCNSTtWr 
~1D 800 ACRE RENT RESTRICT!~ 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad°"' Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
1 ·t83,362 800 247 
2 101,596 1116 
3 122' 119 1471 
4 148,524 1926 
5 182,498 2512 
6 222,965 3312 1 
7 278,429 4112 40 56 
8 339,064 4912 139 36 
9 406,430 5712 232 21 




S!..tt¥1RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGR#l 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE 
INCREASING 2 % ~D RENTAL 
!StlO LNRESTRICTED 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad~ Price 























S~RY OF MIJLTIPERIOD LINEAR PROG!W-1 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
INCREASING 2 !. AND 160 ACRE 
RE.i'fT RESTR I CTI~ 
Land Land Bought Land Bought 
Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan 
Shad!Xll Price 
Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
! 141,457 160 40 751 
2 62,Bi! 320 lQ'? 351 
3 74 '772 480 29 223 
4 90,474 ,540 22 155 
5 !03,356 800 44 103 
6 117 ,484 960 56 77 i ~ 
7 133,045 1120 72 56 
8 151,653 1280 :35 :38 
9 169!539 1441) 22 
10 192,094 !600 270 8 
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TABLE XII 
Sltt1ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE 
INCREASING 2 I. AND 320 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICT!~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad<M Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash \iii th Loan Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ·f59 ,436 320 11 80 373 
2 80,259 640 229 
3 100,053 960 107 
4 119 ,299 1280 13 133 
5 140,870 1600 40 103 
6 164,881 1920 64 77 
7 191,446 2240 91 56 
8 222,755 2560 114 38 
9 253,894 2880 22 
10 292' 160 3200 385 8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Period 
TABLE XI I I 
St.tfi:\RY OF MULTI PERI OD LINEAR PROGRAM 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
INCREASING 2 I. ~~O 480 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICT!~ 
Land Land Bought Land Bought 
Earnings Rented !;ii th Cash l~i th Loan 
ShadCM Price 
Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
l ·$64,414 480 285 
2 94, 106 960 92 
3 114,953 1352 
4 135 I 'f46 1830 
5 170,120 2310 88 
6 202,989 2790 70 77 
i 239,517 3270 94 56 ( 
8 282' 174 3750 133 38 
9 325,407 4230 22 
10 377,818 4710 465 8 
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TABLE XIV 
S~RY OF HULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRtli 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LANO PRICE 
INCREASING 2 I. ANO 640 ACRE 
R~ RESTRICTirtf 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad°'4 Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
·•73,888 640 230 
2 99,082 1076 
3 119,095 1423 
4 144,853 1871 
5 173,407 2511 10 
6 218,969 3151 4 77 
7 262,745 3791 92 56 
8 313,458 4431 120 38 
9 366,231 5071 22 
10 428!971 5711 475 8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE YN 
SIJt1ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRtli 
RESULTS WliH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
INCREASING 2 I. AND 800 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICT!~ 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad°'4 Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
·is3,362 aoo 245 
2 llll ,798 1123 
3 122,589 1484 
4 149,348 1949 
5 183,787 2546 
6 225,820 :3346 
7 279,431 4146 44 56 
8 337,425 4946 113 38 
9 398,617 5746 22 




S~RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROG~ 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
DECREASING 2 I. ~D RENTAL 
LAND ~RESTRICTED 
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadCt.11 Price 





















TABLE XVI I 
S~RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROG~ 
RESULTS !~ITH THE REAL L#ID PRICE 
DECREASING 2 '..~ ~D 160 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICTICN 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad.cw Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
!36,316 160 488 
2 51,744 320 403 
3 66,672 480 327 
4 81,600 640 259 
5 ·~6,528 800 199 
,5 108.862 960 145 
7 120' 158 1120 109 
8 131,454 1230 77 
9 142,750 1440 48 




SlJt\ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGIWI 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
DECREASING 2 I. ~D 320 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICTllJll 
land Land Bought Land Bought 
Earnings Rented With Cash I.iii th Loan 
ShadCl.rl Price 























SL!tt1ARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRPi1 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 












Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadOlil Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
$64,414 480 271 
.. , 
" 94,106 960 87 ., ,, 114,151 1328 
4 135,528 1775 
s 168, 163 2255 83 
6 201,119 2735 tO 
7 238'188 3215 67 
8 279,883 3695 49 
9 326, 782 4175 34 
10 3,59,713 4655 23 
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TABLE XX 
SLttlARY OF HULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRFi't 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE 
DECREASING 2 I. ~D 640 ACRE 
RENT RESTRICT!~ 
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadCM Price 
































Sltt!ARY OF MIJLTIPERIOO LINEAR PROG~ 
RESULTS WITH THE REAL lltlO PRICE 








Land Land Bought Land Bought Shadow Price 









9 .397, 380 
10 469,418 
800 
















TABLE XXI I 
SIJtlARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE INCREASING 2 ;~ 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
-~D RENTAL ~D LNRESTRICTED 
land land Bought land Bought 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With loan 
ShadCM Price 

































SIJtlARY OF MULTiPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
li!ITH THE REAL LAND PRICE INCREASING 2 !. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 iN PERIOD Tli!O 
~D 160 ACRE RENT RESTRICTILN 
Land land Sought Land Sought Shadow 




$40,076 160 8 18 620 
2 68,058 320 170 336 
3 79,324 480 162 
4 96,292 640 48 110 
5 111,018 800 59 BS 
6 127,871 960 83 64 
7 148,222 1120 103 45 
3 169,820 1280 145 30 
9 193,431 1440 173 17 





S~RY OF HULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE INCREASING 2 !. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
~D 320 ACRE RENT RESTRICTICN 
Land Land Bought Land Bought 
Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan 
ShadQl.ll Price 
Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 t51,744 320 483 
2 81,949 640 83 226 
3 100,734 960 86 
4 120,406 1280 16 110 
5 143' 1 '?6 1600 50 85 
6 169,295 1920 83 64 
7 200,444 2240 116 45 
8 234,286 2560 175 30 
9 271,652 2880 220 17 
10 313,055 3200 272 6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE XXV 
Si.M'!ARY OF MULTI PER I OD LINEAR PROGP.AM RES UL TS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE INCREASING 2 '.I. 
AFiER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
AND 480 ACRE RENT RESTRICTION 
Land Land Bought Land Bought ShadQl.ll Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
1 ·$64 ,414 480 298 
2 94' 106 '?60 96 
3 113,545 1309 
4 1:37 ,659 1728 
5 167,285 2208 23 as 
6 201 ,454 2688 73 64 
7 241, 861 3168 117 45 
8 286,460 3648 188 30 
9 335 ,'?74 4128 250 17 
l i} :390,958 4608 318 6 
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TABLE XXVI 
S1Jt¥:1RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRftl RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE INCREASING 2 !. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
~O 640 ACRE RENT RESTRICTI(}I 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad11.11 Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
1 '$73,888 640 242 
2 97,729 1035 
3 117,299 1374 
4 142,489 1811 
5 174,898 2372 
6 214,515 3012 32 64 
7 261,134 3652 93 45 
a 313,340 4292 168 30 
9 371,719 4932 243 17 
10 436,681 5572 324 6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE X:Xl.JII 
Sl.ltVIRY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGR/ll'I RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LANO PRICE INCREASING 2 !. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
AND 800 ACRE RENT RESTRICT!(}! 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shadow Price 
?eriod Earnings Rented l!lith Cash l!lith Loan Of Rent Land 
' $83,362 800 253 i. 
2 100,445 1081 
3 120,793 1434 
4 146,985 1888 
5 180,682 2472 
6 224,050 3222 
7 276,191 4022 'i o. 45 
a 335,521 4822 142 30 
9 402,135 5622 228 17 
10 476,406 6422 321 6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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TABLE XXVI I I 
S~RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE INCREASING 4 :~ 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD l1,.IQ 
~O RENTAL ~D 11-lRESTRICTED 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shad01,11 Price 






















Sitt1ARY OF MULTIPERIOO LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL LAND PRICE INCREASING 4 I. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD l1,.IO 
AND 160 ACRE RENT RESTRICTION 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shadow Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
1 $40,454 160 6 24 628 
2 68,241 320 171 318 
3 79,516 480 i26 
4 96,211 640 50 97 
5 110 ,469 800 59 77 
6 127,402 960 77 59 ., 
144,726 1120 106 43 I 
8 162,935 1230 124 29 
9 182,059 1440 143 1? 





Sl.tttARY OF MULTI PERIOD LINEAR PROG?#I RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE INCREASING 4 !. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
~O 320 ACRE RENT RESTRICTICN 
land Land Bought Land Bought 
Earnings Rented I.Ji th Cash 1.Jith loan 
Shad™ Price 
Of Rent Land 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
I ·rn ,744 320 483 
2 82' 149 640 86 198 
3 100 ,823 960 43 
4 i20,479 1280 19 97 
5 142,881 touo 49 77 
6 169 ,058 1920 75 59 
7 197 ,029 2240 116 43 
8 226,999 2560 147 29 
9 258,899 2880 179 17 
10 292,289 3200 211 6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE XXXI 
Sl~RY OF MUlTIPERIOO LINEAR PROGR~ RESULTS 
1.iJITH THE REAL !A4D PRICE INCREASING 4 :~ 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
AND 480 ACRE RENT RESTRICTICtl 
Land Land Bought Land Bought :3had(M Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Lean Of Rent Land 
$64,414 480 301 
2 '14,106 960 97 
3 !13,704 1314 
4 138,037 !739 
5 167,550 2219 24 77 
6 20! ,846 2699 .:\6 59 
7 239,332 3179 !14 43 
8 279,988 :j,559 158 29 
't 323 .55-5 4139 202 17 




SltttARY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL !Jt-ID PRICE INCREASING 4 i. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
AND 640 ACRE RENT RESTRICTION 
Land Land Bought Land Bought Shadll'll Price 












































Sll~RY OF MULTIPERIOD LINEAR PROGRAM RESULTS 
WITH THE REAL ~D PRICE INCREASING 4 i. 
AFTER DROPPING TO 335 IN PERIOD TWO 
AND 800 ACRE RENT RESTRICTION 
Land Land Bought Land Sought ShadQl.il Price 
Period Earnings Rented With Cash With Loan Of Rent Land 
~83,362 800 254 
2 !00,445 1081 
3 120,952 1439 
4 147,363 1899 
5 131,373 2491 
6 225,!62 3251 
7 276,660 4051 58 43 
8 333,511 4851 123 29 
9 395,127 5651 187 17 




John E. Thomason 
Candidate £or the Degree 0£ 
Master 0£ Science 
Thesis: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENTS IN FARMLAND: A SOURCE OF 
EXTERNAL EQUITY FOR THE FARM SECTOR 
Major Field: Agricultural Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Guthrie, Oklahoma, March 16, 
1963, the son 0£ John D. and Linda Thomason. 
Education: Graduated £ram Mulhall-Orlando High School, 
Orlando, Oklahoma, in May, 1981; received Bachelor 
0£ Science Degree in Agricultural Economics £rom 
Oklahoma State University in May, 1985; completed 
requirements £or the Master 0£ Science Degree at 
Oklahoma State University in May, 1987. 
Pro£essional Experience: Graduate Researh Assistant, 
Oklahoma State University, June, 1985, to January 
1987. 
